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In this thesis, I will present a case for philosophical emergence, and my argument that it 
is too vague. To do this, I will provide an overview to both vagueness and emergence, 
and focus on the issue of emergent levels. I will argue that emergence and its 
characterizations are vague, and that this is a general point, not specific to one single 
definition. Lastly, I will show why this is problematic for theories about emergent levels. 
 
I denne tesen, så skal jeg presentere filosfisk emergens, og argumentere for at det er for 
vagt. Jeg vil gi et overblikk i både vaghet og emergens, med fokus på teorier om 
emergente nivåer. Jeg vil så argumentere for at emergens og dets karakteriseringer er 
vage, og at dette er et generelt poeng, ikke spesifikt til en bestemt definisjon. Til slutt vil 





Our use of language tells us that we humans are quite ontologically entitled beings. We 
would like to know what kinds of birds there are, how many grains of corn equates to a 
heap and what types of radiation that are the most dangerous. All the while we implicitly 
assume that there are such things as kinds, heaps and types to begin with, and not just a 
spectrum of instances or a solid whole. We both divide and group; it seems either to 
make the world more bite-sized and digestible, or because it really represents nature, a 
world of groups and divisions. 
 
To further frame this, we should look at the attempts to structure our world in science 
and philosophy. If we accept a vaguely realistic position, in the sense of scientific realism, a 
clear aim of science would be to figure out the truths about nature. If we are a bit more 
secure in our conviction that science can attain good knowledge about reality, we would 
also want to assign some sort of grid to this knowledge so that we can differentiate 
between kinds, and not just instances (analogous to types and tokens). To substantiate this 
kind of claim, a strong strategy should be to get some insight into differentiating 
properties. Properties that can be used as points of division. Where anything south of 
this point is type A, and north is type B. Insects have six legs, arachnids eight. 
 
Historically categorizations of this kind have proven to be difficult, like Aristotle’s 
famously problematic claim that humans are rational animals. These divisions have come 
a long way, and are paramount to us, in both a scientific everyday sense. We need to be 
able to talk about types of things, and to say what kinds of categories this and that 
belong to, to compress the large amounts of information we are dealing with. We cannot 
go around having different words to refer to each instance of something different. The 
borders between terms and categories are not easily assigned, however. We would like 
the divisions to be based on good reason, rather than to be arbitrarily allotted. If all 
divisions and groupings had certain property differences, then everything could be neatly 
categorized. If we could say that all the phenomena of a certain type of interaction for 
instance, were the domain of physics, and all the phenomena of another type of 
interaction was the domain of chemistry, our problems would be solved. Unsurprisingly, 
5 
 
this ideal has a lot of obstacles to overcome before we can do this with philosophical 
safety, as most properties are not unique to a single phenomenon. 
 
Another issue about defining and dividing is about whether something can be composed 
of other things, and how we separate between the things it is composed of and the thing 
in the full scale. This is essentially divisions of complexity. We divide between levels of 
complexity all the time. Take for instance the difference between a group of atoms and a 
table that the atoms constitute. There seems to be some various clear-cut ways of 
looking at this table. There is the level of regarding the table as its atoms, there is the 
level of molecules, the level of wood, and the level of table. There might be more levels, 
like the level of being an object of some sort (like if you wanted to count all the objects 
in a room, and didn't care about the fact that it was a table, and not, say, a lamp). An 
essential realization about this, is that the table is not simply an abundance of atoms, but 
it is as a system very different than its components. So, what if we could separate 
between different phenomena and scientific areas of study on the complexity of the 
phenomenon? There seems to be a change in the kind of objects we are dealing with, at 
different levels of complex description. 
 
The philosophical theory that embodies dividing phenomena by their level of 
complexity, is emergence. It can be characterized by the maxim that “More is different”. 
Although this is an oversimplification, it reflects the spirit of emergence. It was a 
prevalent way of thinking in the mid 1800’s and up until the early 1900’s among a wave 
of thinkers that have been later called the British Emergentists. Among these were C.D 
Broad, J.S. Mill, Samuel Alexander and Lloyd Morgan (McLaughlin, 2008, p. 19). This 
was an essentially materialist position, that viewed all the phenomena of the world, as 
being various levels of complexity of some base matter, self-organizing and systemized 
by the laws and mechanics of nature (McLaughlin, 2008). This, in turn, provided them 
with a system or hierarchical organization in nature, as laws of biology emerged from 
laws of chemistry, that emerged from the laws of physics. In addition to this hierarchical 
view of natural phenomenon and the sciences that described them, Alexander went even 
further, and postulated a fixed grid of emergent phenomena that existed in the world, 
space and time being the most basic, and each emerging from the other culminating in 
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‘Deity’ emerging from the base level of all the collected human minds. The nature of 
‘Deity’ would be as unknown to us as the nature of the mind is unknown to the physical 
aspect of our brain (McLaughlin, 2008). While this seems outlandish, it follows from the 
basic principles of the philosophy, and as we will see is not radically different from views 
on emergence by thinkers like George F. R. Ellis, except for the more difficult to 
swallow metaphysics. 
 
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in emergence, but with a near 
complete rehabilitation of emergence, which largely does away with its dubious 
metaphysics, and frames emergence in a more scientific perspective. However, the ideas 
about hierarchical structure of complexity have survived. In this thesis, I will only deal 
with the modern debate about emergence, and not with British Emergentism. My focus 
will be with emergent claims about levels and hierarchies, and idea that we can properly 
differentiate between emergent levels.  
 
Emergence looks like a strong contender for dividing and grouping our nature neatly, by 
using complexity as the standard property of doing so. The use of emergence in academia 
is usually loose and widely applicable. Whenever phenomena appear out of seemingly 
dissimilar components, emergence can be invoked to classify it. When we are looking at 
cases of emergence, to help inform our philosophical debate there are many examples to 
choose from. There are wisdom of crowds examples, which claim that if you have a large 
collection of educated guesses at a subject (e.g. farmers guessing the weight of oxen or 
taxi drivers’ estimation of downtown traffic at a given time), the mid-point between all 
the guesses will tend to be more correct then any single guess. So, that we could say that 
no single guess was right, but the guess of the system as a whole was right and therefore 
an emergent property. In biology, phenomena like the complex behavior of ants has 
been cited as emergent, because the ants by themselves are very basic and non-complex, 
compared to the organization of the ant hill that can perform tasks like farm fungus, 
move home and have designated garbage disposal areas, without any of these things 
being attributable to any single ant. In modern science, complexity, and with it 
emergence, is gaining conceptual ground. In computation, a hugely influential scientific 
area, various kinds of complexity are being developed, investigated and used, and the 
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language we use about this reflects a turn towards emergence, as a way of viewing these 
systems. Ellis further nominates evolution, earthquakes, sociology and many more 
subjects, besides computation, as being emergent (2006, p. 80, p. 83). The examples are 
many and varied, but as this philosophical discourse demands, we must narrow down the 
requirements for emergence. In chapter two I will investigate the conditions that are 
required for stating that something emerges from something else, and the kinds of things 
that can emerge. 
 
The paradigmatic case of modern weak emergence, which is the type of emergence that 
is the focus of this thesis, are cellular automatons. These are discrete, abstract 
mathematical systems, but ones that can be realized in various “real life” systems. A 
cellular automaton consists of a lattice of cells, each with a state value assigned to it, 
from a finite set of states. This grid of cells can be one, two or three-dimensional. The 
set of rules for this lattice of cells is one that decides the state of each cell one the 
grounds of the states of its neighborhood of cells, so that there are no actions at a 
distance. At each time step, the value or state of each cell is changed or kept because of 
the state of its neighboring cells. This system is completely deterministic, but still its cells 
can form surprising and different macro structures that are not readily derivable or 
reducible. The reason why we should be interested in these systems when discussing 
emergence, is that they give us arguably the most easily dissectible case of weakly 
emergent phenomena, that will prove useful when trying to identify the conditions of 
macro phenomena emerging from a micro base level. We will see why these are 
considered weakly emergent in section 2.2.1. 
 
In philosophy, there are certain problems that, once you notice them, they never seem to 
go away. For me, this is the case with the problems of division and definition. It is an 
exceedingly difficult prospect, to define exactly what it means for something to be high, 
for instance. Firstly, we must disambiguate the term, and decide what kind of high we 
are talking about, whether it is a drug induced high, or if the thing is simply tall. If it is 
the latter, a mountain would probably not be high if it was as high as a high bookshelf, 
so it seems context dependent. How high does a mountain need to be to be high 
anyway, and how many rocks do we need to stack on top of a hill before it becomes a 
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mountain? This last problem is a version of the heap paradox, and it pertains to the 
philosophical study of vagueness. A vague term or predicate is a term or predicate that 
have an unknown extension; meaning that we don’t know, and probably cannot know, 
the exact cases it is true for. There is nothing an all-knowing geologist could tell you that 
would make you realize when a hill goes from being a hill to being a mountain, other 
than just defining some arbitrary cut off point like ‘rock formations of 500m and up are 
mountains’. No amount of research about hills and mountains would tell you either. I 
claim that emergent levels are vague in this exact way, and I hold that this is a problem 
for the doctrine of emergent levels. 
 
The philosophical study of vagueness is primarily a linguistic one, insofar as we take the 
vagueness of certain terms to be a property of the language that they exist in. There are 
those that would argue that even these kinds of examples of vagueness are not created 
by language, but rather represent a real divide that, in theory, could be traced to a set 
point. Someone with an epistemic view of vagueness, would say that there is an actual 
number n drops of red paints that makes a bucket of yellow paint turn red, and an exact 
point n of height in meters that differentiates hills from mountains. The problem is just 
that in vague cases, we have no way of knowing what that exact number n is. Vagueness, 
in this view, is an epistemic problem, rather than a problem of language. I will show that 
no matter the theory of vagueness one accepts, they will be problematic for the 
emergence doctrine. 
 
To best make my argument, I want to look at is whether there are good philosophical 
grounds for establishing emergent levels, if these kinds of levels are as clear cut and 
simple as they seem, and whether we can ever reliably identify them. I also want to argue 
that emergent accounts of these levels are susceptible to vagueness. Lastly, I want to find 
out whether these levels reflect some sort of natural hierarchy. To do this, I will first give 
an overview of different accounts of vagueness in chapter one. Then, in chapter two, I 
will give an overview of modern emergence, dissecting the terms and its different 
characterizations, scope of application, types of emergence and lastly some accounts of 
emergent levels. In the closing chapter, I will stake out my argument against the weak 
notion of emergence, specifically that it is too problematic to identify the emergent 
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levels, because the extension of what levels are emergent is incurably vague. Incurable 
because all the possible reasonable characteristics of emergence are vague, and therefore 
any definition of emergence that include these will either be too weak, too vague or too 
arbitrary. Explicitly, my argument is this: 
 
1. The novelty condition of emergence is either too weak or too arbitrary 
2. The non-reducibility condition is either vague or too strong. 
3. The non-derivability condition is vague 
4. Because of (1)(2) and (3), any functional definition of emergence is vague. 
5. Show that Emergent hierarchical levels are inconsistent with vagueness. 
6. Because of (4) and (5), we must accept one of the following: 
a. Accept a nihilistic conclusion 
i. This is in the case that you reject the possible accounts for 
vagueness. 
b. Accept epistemic vagueness 
i. This is in the case that you want to keep emergent hierarchical 
levels. 
c. Deny emergent hierarchical levels. 
i. This is in the case that you cannot accept epistemic vagueness. 
In additions to the three consequences sketched out here, I will sketch out my reasons 
that the denial of emergent hierarchical levels is the least problematic of the three. I will 
then defend my argumentation against several possible lines of critique. In summary, this 
thesis argues my claim that if the candidate properties that are meant to separate 
emergent levels from one another are vague, the system cannot be as rigid, and 
ontologically sound or epistemically, as the emergentists would like. My thesis is not that 
the philosophical project of emergence is of no use - instead I think that having a system 
and a language to dissect phenomena and problems through the lens om emergence can 
be a tremendous scientific tool, at it has shown to be in computation. In the end, my aim 
is that the vague analysis of emergent levels will motivate us to refrain from the 
ontological commitments of emergence, not because it is necessarily untrue, but because 






Chapter One: Vagueness 
The issue of vagueness made its modern debut in 1994 with Timothy Williamsons aptly 
named book “Vagueness”. It re-introduced an ancient discussion about terms that don’t 
seem to have clear boundaries, into the journals of philosophy. His treatment, and 
surprising solution to the issue, would bring about a wave of contemporary writings in 
philosophy of language and logic that tried to tackle the challenges that vagueness 
brought with it. Regardless of this, vagueness is quite often ignored in discussion where 
it could be invoked, as I will attempt to show later, in the case of emergence. 
1.1 Sorites 
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, vagueness is an ancient problem. Its true age is 
unknown but it is attributed to the Greek philosopher and maker of riddles, Eubulides 
of Miletus. He posed the following dialectic puzzle: If you have a single grain of corn, is 
this then a heap? Obviously, the answer is no. How about if we add one more grain to it, 
making it two grains, does this now constitute a heap? Still, I would say, the answer is 
no. This question is then repeated, adding one more grain of corn each time the reply is 
no. The crux of the riddle is two-fold. First, the person answering the questions might at 
some point say yes to one of these propositions. Let’s say at seven grains of corn. If you 
give an answer like this, then you must admit that this seems arbitrary. Why not six or 
eight? There is no real reason to say that seven grains of corn constitute a heap, while six 
doesn’t, other than just deciding on seven to have the riddler stop bothering you. 
The second part of this argument is that the former realization that stopping at any 
specific point is arbitrary, will lead us accept that there is no point n where n is not a 
heap, while n+1 is a heap; or simply that one single grain of corn can never make the 
difference between a heap and a non-heap. After all, it would always seem like an 
arbitrary division, no matter where n is situated on the spectrum. This assumption would 
then, in turn, make you vulnerable for a reduction ad absurdum. If no such point exists, 
and you start out at one grain, then you could keep going up in increments of one 
indefinitely, and no matter how many grains of corn you have, it would never amount to 
a heap. To put it explicitly:  
1. One grain of corn is not a heap 
2. If n is not a heap, then n +1 is not a heap. 
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3. Because 1 is not a heap, 2 is not a heap (Follows from 1 and 2) 
4. Because 2 is not a heap, 3 is not a heap (Follows from 3 and 2) 
5. …. 
6. Because 999 is not a heap, 1000 is not a heap. 
This conclusion, that a 1000 grains of corn is not a heap, is clearly false. The two first 
assumptions lead to an unacceptable answer. This is a heap paradox, also known as the 
sorites paradox. The name is derived from the ancient Greek word for heap, “sōrós”, and 
the terms heap paradox and sorites are used interchangeably. Before we dissect this and 
see which, if any, assumption we should dismiss to account for this apparent paradox, 
there are a couple of important properties of this argument that needs our attention. The 
first of which is that this is in no way an argument specific to heaps. It seems to be a 
common feature of terms where a kind of incremental progression is possible. Terms 
like lake, coffee and many, are obvious contenders for vagueness. You could add one drop 
of water to a crater and in every instance, ask when it turns into a lake. You could have a 
cup of hot water, and put in some tiny amount of instant coffee in increments, then 
proceed by asking when the liquid turns from simply being hot water into coffee. With a 
lot of these examples, you could simply change out the word “heap” in the heap 
example with some other predicate, and you’ve got a new variation. How many pages do 
you have to add to a pamphlet before it turns into a book, or how many hairs do you 
need to lose, before you are bald? We should also notice that these can be made to go 
either way. Just as it works from non-heap to heap, it will function the same way if we 
start off with a clear case of a heap, like a thousand grains of corn, and then make the 
claim that there is no number of grains n where n is a heap, while n-1 is not. 
Vagueness is sometimes seen as a problem of disagreement rather than logic, because if 
we did some statistical survey of what people think a heap should be, what is stopping us 
from just using the result from the poll to help us define the exact point where a heap 
stops being a heap? If we equated the true extension of a predicate with some notion of 
statistical conformity, we might be able to avoid the problem altogether. This line of 
answering the problem is misleading because we want to be able to say that people are 
wrong or right in stating propositions, and the statistical view won’t allow for this 
because some people might answer the poll without knowing anything about a heap, and 
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the things that make a heap, and thus skew the results in the wrong direction. The 
decision of accepting this as true, would then simply be arbitrary. It would just amount 
to the sum of a group arbitrarily deciding the boundaries, instead of just one person 
doing so. If we do accept this kind of statistical determination of predicates, and 
meaning is relegated to statistical consent, then the reasoning behind acceptance of a 
proposition becomes a circular one: ‘there is consent in that proposition p is true, 
because there is consent that p is true’ (Williamson, 1994).  
Now at this point it is important to disambiguate vagueness from something being 
inaccurate, imprecise or unspecified. The latter is not much of a challenge; vagueness is 
not unspecifity, even though they are often used interchangeably in normal speech. If 
someone asks me to meet him or her somewhere, at no particular time, I could say that 
was a bit vague, even though philosophically speaking, it would not be vague, but merely 
unspecified. (Even though both “somewhere” and “particular time” are vague in the 
philosophical sense). The difference being that unspecifity is not providing enough 
information, but vagueness is there, no matter how much information you have. There is 
nothing anyone could tell you that would make the differentiating between a heap and a 
non-heap any easier. We should also set vagueness apart from misinformation, because it 
if someone tells you to meet them at one o’clock and they don’t show up until two, it is 
not them being vague as to when you should meet up, but they’re simply dealing in 
misinformation. Similarly, them saying ‘meet me when the clock strikes a number that 
ends in two’, is not a case of the statement being vague, the extension of the statement is 
merely too big to be practical. For every time t, we can easily check if t ends in the 
number 2, so there are no borderline cases. Even if you allow for infinite decimal points 
on the clock, for every number t it will always be non-vague whether it ends on a two or 
not. 
1.2 The Core Problem 
To return, from the specifics of what cases count as vague, to its wider consequences in 
philosophy, it turns out that the sorites seems like a paradox may lie with the principle of 
bivalence. This principle states there is only two possible truth values, true and false. 
That for every statement, there is a definite truth to that statement, or not, regardless of 
what we know about it. Bivalence, also known as the law of excluded middle, is one of 
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the main pillars of classical logic. Without it, it would be challenging indeed to define the 
principles of logical operators, and to keep our well established laws of logical validity. If 
we then present a proposition to which neither truth or falsity could reasonably be 
attributed, it would spell trouble for this principle, and by extension, classical logic. 
Vague propositions do just that. 
Consider the following proposition: “Six grains of corn make a heap”. This sentence is 
impossible and unreasonable to conclude as either true or false, as the number six 
cannot be attributed to the extension of either heap nor non-heap (Incidentally, if you 
disagree with my portrayal of six as a vague case of heap, then just change the number to 
something that is clearly vague to you. This exercise will also hopefully underline the 
point that these terms are hard to classify). We can make similar cases with all vague 
predicates. To spare bivalence of this criticism we would have to, for all heap-paradoxes, 
be able to state that every line of the argument (the repeating incremental question 
pattern) is either true or false. This cannot be done, without some good explanation, like 
the one provided by Timothy Williamson which we will look at later in this chapter, who 
sees this loss of bivalence as a great loss to logic: 
“To reject bivalence is to lose both the account of the meaning of basic logical operators 
and the mechanical test of validity for inference forms involving them provided by the 
two-valued truth-tables.” (Williamson, 1994, p. 99) 
The problem is not contained only by the principle of bivalence, as it seems to permeate 
all n-value logical systems. We could postulate a three-valued system of logic, where the 
third value represented something being meaningless, like the Swedish logician Sören 
Halldèn attempted (Williamson, 1994, pp. 103-108) so that for all propositions, there are 
three and only three possible answers, True, False and Meaningless. Say we identify our 
earlier proposition about six grains of corn making a heap as meaningless. It is neither 
true nor false, so it should be labeled as such. Although this solves the problem of the 
excluded middle at first glance, as we now should be able to damn the pesky borderline 
cases to just be meaningless. However, it does not take much prodding before we see 
this quick fix tearing at the seams. Because just as easy as we can make sorites examples 
with two valued logics, we could do so with three, there is still no hard border between 
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true and meaningless, or meaningless and false. When does something go from being 
meaningless to being true? 
1.2.1 Higher Order Vagueness 
These kinds of attempt to clarify vagueness are trying to invent some second order 
language solution to a first order language problem. The assumption is that if we could 
just clarify the language we use to describe the vague predicates, they would no longer be 
vague. This point is made clearer if we introduce a new operator, D which will signify a 
clear case of something when operating with vague predicates. If we say that F is a vague 
predicate, we can use the D operator to signify something being clearly a case of F like 
so: DFx, clearly not being the case D~Fx, and not clearly being the case ~DFx. This 
move to the second order allows us to make room for more cases of F, there might be 
some that were not clearly F that we could take account of without the D operator. 
Although we allow for more kinds of cases of F, and relationships to its extension, there 
is still the problem of there being gaps in between these cases where vagueness can hide, 
this is second order vagueness. There could well be cases that are neither clearly vague, 
clearly not vague or not clearly vague, and thus the extension of F is still not certain. Let 
us then, move up another level, a third-order description, and add the D operator to 
these three cases. We’ll then end up with the following nine cases: DDFx, DD~Fx, 
D~Dfx, D~DFx, D~D~Fx, D~~Dfx, ~DDFx, ~DD~Fx and ~D~Dfx. Now, 
besides the complaint that it seems arbitrary that the third order of logic should succeed 
in ridding us of vagueness, where the second order failed, there is nothing new on this 
level. We can just as easily make a sorites paradox with the predicate “clearly a clear case 
of heap” as we can with “heap” itself; the problem remains the same: there will 
seemingly always be gaps in between the different possible cases of F, and it seems to be 
doomed to vagueness, no matter the order of it. If the metalanguage used to describe the 
language of the vague predicate is vague, the vagueness will stay with us1. 
1.3 Solving the Problem 
In summary, what can we say about the problem of vagueness itself? I would say at least 
this: the solution to this problem must either use some metalanguage, or order of 
                                              
1 For a more in depth analysis of the logic of the D operator that there is room for here, see Rosanna Keefe ’s 
excellent account of it (Keefe, 2000).  
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abstraction that does not itself contain any vagueness, declare the world as not vague or 
ultimately give up. A tall order either way. The attempted solutions to vagueness align 
with this insight closely. Starting with the latter, we could accept its paradoxical nature, 
and thereby accept a sort of nihilism. This alternative is not particularly interesting to 
pursue, for obvious reasons, and is not a place most philosophers would like to end up. 
We would have to throw out logic straight away, because if a hundred corns of grains 
can be a heap and not a heap at the same time, we would have nothing to build logic on, 
because acceptance of self-contradictory, paradoxical claims, is not exactly solid ground. 
So even though it is useful to see where one might end up, if we cannot make up our 
minds regarding the problem of vagueness, it is not the place to start our search for a 
viable solution. 
The second approach to the problem of vagueness is to attempt to create a space for 
vagueness in logic, and this is one we’ve already touched on. The attempt of any n-value 
logic does not seem fruitful at first glance, but it shouldn’t be written off so quickly. I 
want to analyze the consequences to vagueness of accepting another variant of multiple 
value-logic: an infinite-value system. I also want to investigate an alternate way forward, 
through Supervaluation. 
1.3.1 Infinite Value Logic 
Vagueness seems to be a property of terms that would like to be more binary, and 
solutions like higher order descriptions of vagueness try to make it even more binary, 
and solve the problem that way, by the route of extreme defining. But what if the 
solution is found at the other end of the spectrum, what if truth and falsity is not best 
measured in binary true and false, but is a more fading, analog thing, where something 
can be more or less true in every possible degree, avoiding the problem all together. 
Seven grains of sand might not be either a heap or not a heap, but maybe it is half true 
that it is a heap, maybe it is 0.0342 true on a scale from 0 to 1. This is the kind of 
intuition that leads us to thinking infinite value logic might be viable as a solution to the 
problem of vagueness. There is progress to be had here, moving from specific n-valued 
systems. The greatest asset of the system is that we can reflect the truth of a vague 
expression to the perfect degree at face value, at least in theory. Infinite value logic does 
not assume that we can reliably attribute the exact degree of truth, or discriminate 
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between something being say 0.767 true and 0.768 true. The continuum of truth values 
just makes room for the possibility (Williamson, 1994, p. 113). Armed with this, we can 
quite trivially account for the sorites paradox. For each increment of grains added to the 
would be heap, the truth of the statement ‘is n grains of corn a heap’ goes up to a 
corresponding value. 
In the end, even this kind of infinite continuum fails the challenge of vagueness, because 
we can still find some refuge of sharp boundaries. The difference between something 
being 0.99999999999 true and something being true to a complete degree of 1 
(remember, the scale is 0 to 1), is only a fraction of a degree, yet there is a substantial 
difference between being as close as you can get to true without being true, and being 
completely, no holds barred true. The same goes for the difference between almost false 
and completely false. We could still make a sorites that says, when does something go 
from being a true heap, to an almost completely true heap. There are many additional 
considerations when looking at a new value system to replace bivalence, other than the 
way it deals with the vagueness or sorites, of course. There are discussions that can be 
had about whether it preserves modus ponens, and how truth-functionality is can be 
formalized when the operators need to deal in degrees, but none of this is of further 
importance for our later application2. 
1.3.2 Supervaluation 
Supervaluation is one of the most prominent way, and certainly the most successful, to 
solve the problems vagueness poses to logic, without resolving to an epistemic view. It 
introduces a new, stronger notion of logical truth, called supertruth and defines this 
using “precisifications”. Rosanna Keefe states that a theory that tries to avoid the 
epistemic view needs to be able to fulfill the following three objectives: (i) It should 
allow for cases of vague predicates to be neither true nor false. (ii) It should “avoid the 
commitment to sharp boundaries with vague predicates”. (iii) It should be “tried and 
tested logic”, that does not break too harshly with our intuitions or lead us into strange 
unforeseen consequences (Keefe, 2000, p. 153). 
                                              
2 For an extensive account of many-valued logics and infinite value logic see (Williamson, 1994). 
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In brief, Supervaluation states that Truth (that is the proper truth with a capital T), is 
supertruth. Conversely, falsity is superfalsity. Things are supertrue or superfalse, if and 
only if, they are true or false on all possible precisifications. A precisifications is a certain 
interpretation of the extension of a vague predicate. When talking about something 
being big, like a clearly vague predicate, we would say that some things might be said to 
be big, and might be said to be small, leaving big to have an unclear extension. If we call 
a football big, then that might be true on some precisifications, while untrue on others, 
rendering it indeterminate. This also works for ontological vagueness, as in the 
proposition “There is an odd number of houses in Bergen”. This statement, on all 
precisifications, will be either true or false; that is, no matter the division of what count 
as Bergen or not, and no matter the way we count a tree as being inside the border or 
not, it will always be true or untrue, and therefore, in Supervaluation, be indetermined. 
An example of something being supertrue would be “1 is a number”, because it will be 
true on every presifications.  
What is important to take away from this discussion in the context of my later argument, 
is that Supervaluation deals with vagueness in such a way that it stays vague, it does not 
remove vagueness from ontology in the way the epistemic view does. It is not a denial of 
vagueness in language, rather it accepts it, but conforms logic to fit its challenges. 
Consequently, any claims about a predicate being vague cannot be “solved” by calling on 
Supervaluation, because it cannot do anything other than saying that certain extensions 
of a predicate is supertrue or superfalse, or indetermined. To provide us with ontological 
bivalence, you would need an epistemic view that gives borderline cases an “actual” 
ontological status of either true or false. Supervaluation cannot help you out of any 
vagueness-related ontological problems, because it simply rescues logic from vagueness’ 
consequences for bivalence, it does not give you any tools to deal with the ontology of 
vague predicates, even theoretically. For this, you need an epistemic view. 
  
1.3.3 Epistemic Vagueness 
If none of these solutions are satisfactory, then the last refuge of non-nihilism is in an 
epistemic account of vagueness. This is most famously put forward by Timothy 
Williamson, and I will use his account of it as found in Vagueness (1994) as representative 
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for this kind of argument. It differs as a possible solution from the abovementioned, in 
the way that it doesn’t struggle as much with explanatory power, as it does in motivation 
for this kind of explanation; meaning that this way of viewing vague predicates is not as 
intuitive. 
The argument begins with the denial of the second premise in a sorites argument; If n is 
not a heap, then n +1 is not a heap. For Williamson, this is false. This point exists, yet we 
simply do not have epistemic access to know the value. If we accept this, then we can 
keep the principle of bivalence, because for every proposition including a vague 
predicate, it is either true or false (Williamson, 1994, p. 217). There is no case of “is n-
number of corn a heap”, where the answer is truly a borderline case, but there are still 
plenty where it is either unknowable, uncertain, or both. On this account, vagueness is 
merely a manifestation of ignorance. 
If vagueness is not truly there, and it is not in our language, then how is our epistemic 
processes to blame? There needs to be some sort of epistemic filter that translates non-
vague phenomena, to vagueness in a non-vague language. Williamson gives two basic 
insights that explain this. Firstly, we can have inexact knowledge. Secondly, there is no 
reason for why we should know the borders of our own terms (Williamson, 1994, p. 
216). It is quite reasonable to assume that humans do not have perfect insight into 
ourselves, or the way we view the world around us. So, the presumption that the borders 
of the terms we use are not available to us, is not a problematic one. But while it is easy 
to explain our ignorance, the case of our knowledge is more demanding. This inexact 
knowledge, while still constituting as true or untrue, is so about non-exact matters. 
Williamson gives the example of someone surveying a large mass of people, trying to 
estimate the number of people in the crowd (Williamson, 1994, pp. 217-226). The 
crowd-watcher estimates there being around 20.000 people there. Now whatever this 
estimated number of people may be, there is no way of verifying that it is true or not. 
This does not, however, disqualify the viewer from having gained some knowledge 
about the number of people present. It is for example, not only one person present, and 
there is certainly not 10 billion people in the crowd. But the viewer cannot have the 
knowledge that there is 20.000 people in the crown, even if the estimation is correct. 
This is because the viewer would not be able to differentiate between 20.000 and say 
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19.000 or 20.001 (n + 1, or n – 1). No amount of discussion or analysis could get you to 
a true knowledge about the exact number of people in the crowd. Indeed, for every 
possible number n where n is a guess about the size of the crowd, we could say that the 
viewer would not be able to differentiate between a crowd of n and a crowd of n – 1 or n 
+ 1. This knowledge seems to be, just in the nature of it being the way it is, unknowable, 
while it still seems to be the case that the observer has some knowledge about the crowd. 
One of the thickest veins of critique against Williamsons position is centered around 
question of whether we have a good motive for viewing vagueness as an epistemic 
phenomenon, rather than one rooted in language. There are other paradoxes, like self-
referring paradoxes, that would be hard-pressed to be presumed to be of an epistemic 
nature, rather than an artifact of logic or language. Why should the case of vagueness be 
any different? Regardless if this account of vagueness is true or not, the main take away 
for our later application, is that epistemic vagueness, while not forfeiting bivalence, and 
providing us with at least the possibility of a non-vague extension of terms, the 
vagueness does not dissipate from our epistemology. Even though epistemic vagueness 
retains classical logic, the non-vague references of our language are not readily available 








Chapter Two: Emergence 
The modern account of emergence is often one that goes hand in hand with some sort 
of scientific discipline. Where it used to come from philosophers, this idea is now 
widespread in certain emergent minded scientific communities; The kinds of sciences 
where wholes seem to have operational modes all to themselves. Biology, chemistry and 
computation are all bringing their expertise and cases of study to the field of emergence. 
Consequently, the meaning and use of emergent vocabulary, and concepts will typically 
be different between programmers, biologists and physicists, although there is some set 
of core ideas that repeat across all the uses. 
The term is lightly used in most cases, and is used to describe everything from some 
unintentional side effect, or interaction dynamics. A former case could be if a garden was 
designed to be serene and silent, but inadvertently turned in to a blooming social arena. 
Or that faking injuries on the football field to get free kicks has become a part of the 
game, despite it never being intended as such. The second is when describing different 
systems interacting in such a way that new system appears. An example of this would be 
that you could run, but you could also jump, and if you combine the two, you would 
achieve a forward moving jump that none of the two other systems alone would be able 
to give you. These examples are only emergent in the most superfluous sense, as the 
supposedly emergent property was there all along (and who is to say that running 
forwards is not an emergent property of forward jumping whilst not jumping?). 
The way in which this philosophical analysis will treat emergence is, like vagueness, 
predictably a bit different. To understand emergence, we first need to pick it apart by its 
seems, and identify the characteristics of the phenomenon. 
 
2.1 The anatomy of emergent properties 
When talking about emergence, we usually focus on properties. We operate with 
properties in such a way that a certain compound of materials, in a certain structure has a 
certain, definite set of properties. For instance, a compound of materials can be set up in 
such a way that it only reflects red light off the surface, giving the property a red color 
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when viewed from the outside. This would count as a basic property, along with all the 
other, listable features of the compound materials in question. 
An emergent property, is a property of a system of physical materials, that has attained a 
type of complexity, such that it starts to display different, novel features, which are not 
found in its constituent properties. This deserves some unwrapping. This does not entail 
that the connection between the lower level parts, and the emergent properties, is a 
causal one, but as we will see in section 2.1.4, it probably needs to be supervenient. 
Our definition of what the emergent property is should be a functional one, meaning 
that we view the functional aspects of the emergent phenomena as the thing that 
emerges. In the case of the mental being emergent from the physical, a functional 
description of the mental phenomena is what we take to be the higher-order emergent 
property. 
2.1.1 Novelty 
A central claim in the literature arguing for emergent understandings is that some cases 
of complexity can display novel properties to those things the complexity constitutes of. 
A notable example of this can be found in the claim that the mental is an emergent 
property from its physical base. As little as we know about the physical and the mental, 
we at least know that they are not the same, functionally speaking. The emergentist 
hypothesis that this relationship is emergent says that a certain type of complex 
configuration of relatively simple physical material, arranged in the form of a human 
brain in a live human, produces a consciousness.  This mental then is not like anything 
you could have in a physical form, it is novel. The novelty characterization is twofold, the 
higher order property must be different from the lower level, and it must be the kind of 
property that could not be a lower level property. Jaegwon Kim argues that this feature 
is a necessary feature for emergence for it to succeed in its aspirations (Kim, Making 
Sense of Emergence, 2008). Without it, emergence will be left without the theoretical 
punch it needs, because the emergent property would simply be additive or identical. 
The novelty condition is one that is usually defined quite intuitively. I hold the account 
of novelty as given by S. Rasmussen, N. A. Baas, B. Mayer and M. Nillson to be one of 
the more extensive and robust. They state that at heart, the novelty condition can be 
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defined like this: “A property that applies at a given level is emergent if it does not apply 
at any lower level.” (Rasmussen, Baas, Mayer, & Nillson, 2008). I take this as not 
including emergent properties that are in essence a higher degree of some shared lower 
level and higher order property, compared to the lower level. Like some components 
being slightly blue, and the whole being very blue. But that the features of the macro 
structure are different in some respect, in addition to not applying, to the micro 
structure. I assume this because I think it is a breach of the definitions intention if cases 
where a macro structure merely has a more prominent version of a feature, are counted 
as emergent. I also take this to not include negative features, like some macro structure 
not having the properties of its micro structure. This too because it goes against what I 
take to be the intention of novelty, that something is added, not novelty in subtracting 
features. 
2.1.2 Non-derivability 
Emergent properties should not be predictable, or derivable, from its component parts, 
such that the emergent property is cannot be attributed directly to its base. The reason 
why we would want this as condition for something being emergent, is that it fits our 
intuitions about what emergence should be like. When we say, something is emergent 
from something else, it entails that the higher order property is somehow separate from 
the lower level ones, if they were not separate, then it would just be a direct property of 
the lower level. Without the separation between the lower and higher level, the 
relationship between them would be describable as straightforwardly causal, and higher 
order phenomenon would be epiphenomenon, improbable and uninteresting as causal 
powers themselves. Non-derivability provides us with this wall of separation in the form 
that even if we are given full knowledge about the base properties of some domain, we 
would not be able to derive its emergent properties from it. 
The unpredictability characterization of emergence is related to novelty. Because a lot of 
the novelty of a phenomenon stems from its non-derivability (Kim, Making Sense of 
Emergence, 2008). If some atomic property, like a carpet fiber, is soft, then we could 
predict that a square 1x1m carpet would also be soft, maybe in an unusual way, but still 
soft. This property is both predictable and not new. If, on the other hand, the 1x1m 
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carpet would turn out to be able to fly, then that would be unpredictable, and thereby 
also novel. 
Non-derivability can be defined quite straight-forwardly like this: something B is non-
derivable from something else A if and only if no amount of knowledge about the 
conditions and interactions of A, and no amount of analytical capacity would allow you 
to derive B with certainty. This type of non-derivability is strict to the extreme, we allow 
for no probability calculus. This is not “actual” non-derivability, as defined by the 
current abilities we have at deriving something, but rather the kind of theoretical non-
derivability, that an infinite all-knowing Laplacian demon would not be able to get past. 
Anything that is even remotely theoretically derivable, by the most time consuming, 
unpractical way, does not count.  
A way to argue that non-derivability is possible, or at least as common as to 
accommodate a range of emergent phenomena, is to invoke multiple realizability. The 
argument, in short form, is that some types of phenomena, like mental phenomena 
types, could be actuated by not only one, but several types of lower level phenomenon. 
Say for instance someone is in pain in form of a headache, and this same kind of pain 
can be caused by distinct types of chemical imbalances, even though the sensations of 
pain is interchangeable. This type of Headache, in this example, would be multiply 
realizable, because several types of physiological conditions, would realize the same type 
of. This point of multiple realizability in the non-derivability of emergence will not be 
discussed further in my thesis, partly because it is not a required aspect of the non-
derivability condition, and because this is a stronger point with the strong emergence 
debate, which is not my focus, and lastly because the debate about it is too large and 
unwieldy to represent properly while still retaining my own focus3. 
There are weaker ways of defining the non-derivability characterization that are more 
directly useful for our purposes, like Mark A. Bedaus non-derivability except by 
simulation (Bedau, 2008). In this article, he attempts to avoid the strictness of proper 
non-derivability, to make room for a weaker sense of emergence. In his sense, something 
is non-derivable except by simulation if and only if the only way of deriving a result from 
                                              




some set of initial conditions, is to step by step, replicate the functions of the system 
step by step, in a one to one scale. This entails that there are no theoretical shortcuts to 
what set of emergent properties will spawn from a certain set of component parts. The 
only way of predicting it is to do an experiment, observe the emergent results and then 
inductively predict that the same will happen again with the same set of component 
parts, ceteris paribus. The reason emergent properties need to be unpredictable in this 
sense, is that otherwise a strong point could be made that nothing emerged, it was all 
there in the component parts all along. This reasoning behind this variant is best 
understood considering the cellular automata, which will be discussed in detail in section 
2.2.1.  
Emergent phenomena could be inductively predictable, in that we know what the same or 
similar conditions led to the last time, and assume it will do so again. The 
unpredictability of emergence is a purely deductive claim, that with all possible 
knowledge of the component parts, we will not be able to predict the emergent outcome 
with certainty, avoiding inductive reasoning.  
2.1.3 Non-reducibility 
Another important aspect of emergent properties is that they should be causally distinct, 
and not reducible to the causal powers of the component properties. If this is not 
granted, then emergent properties would be epiphenomena; causal dead ends. This 
commitment to distinctive causal powers for emergent properties, in turn, leads the 
emergentist to have to accept downward causation, because if emergent properties can 
have causal powers on other emergent properties, and the state change of emergent 
properties entail a state change in component properties, then higher order causality 
entail downward causation. This non-reducibility means that emergent phenomena 
should neither be reducible in the way described above, but also that they are not 
explainable in terms of its component properties.  
This non-reducible aspect of emergence can, and has been, critiqued for being a negative 
characterization, and therefor uninteresting. Jaegwon Kim argues that things that have a 
certain characterization, like things that are rectangular, or green, constitutes a group of 
things to a greater degree than things that have a negative characterization do, like being 
not-rectangular or not-green (Kim, Being Realistic about Emergence, 2006, p. 201). 
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Members of the positive characterization could be things like houses and books, grass 
and green pencils, while the members of the negative characterization could be 
democracies and words in both cases, as neither are rectangular nor green. The 
characterization might as well have been non-characters in Sherlock Holmes or members 
of the British parliament in 1947. The members of the positive characterization could be 
said to have something in common, saying that about the negative would be a stretch. 
Because of this, negative characterizations are often too weak for them to be relevant in 
categorization, and not being reducible certainly fits the bill of a negative 
characterization. Nonetheless it is included in most definitions of emergence in the 
literature, so it would be misguided to cast it aside before starting, but this critique will 
be revisited when analyzing Kim’s arguments on emergence. 
If emergence with this kind of non-reducibility is true about the human mind, this would 
mean that you cannot reduce or explain the experience of consciousness from facts 
about the brain. This might seem counterintuitive, because we do this all the time. We 
know some things about the causal relationship between the brain and the mind, and we 
can explain some mental diseases for instance, by explaining certain chemical imbalances 
in the brain, that correlate to the conscious states in some way. The problem here is that 
these psychological phenomena are multiply realizable. This means that there are 
multiple arrangements, compositions and variants of lower level constitute parts, that 
will end up producing the same higher level emergent phenomena. We can find a clear 
analogy to this concept in programming, where the macro features of a software can be 
realized through several different implementations. George F. R. Ellis gives us a helpful 
indicator for why this could be: 
“Higher-level behaviour is based on throwing away vast amounts of information, 
selecting what is relevant from a vast flow of incoming information, storing it, analyzing 
it in a broad existential context, differentially amplifying it, and utilizing it in feedback 
control systems” (Ellis, 2006) 
However, the arguments from multiple realizability are not, like most other philosophical 
areas, undisputed. 
The basic idea of reductionism is that some phenomena is explainable, or constituent of, 
nothing more than something else; that A is reducible to B iff A is nothing but B. There 
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are several distinct types of reduction available to us, John Searle provides us with five 
categories of reductions (Searle, 2008, ss. 70-71) : 
1. Ontological reduction – Objects of one type constitute nothing but objects of 
another type. 
2. Property ontological reduction – Properties types of objects constitute nothing 
but properties of another object types 
3. Theoretical reduction – The laws of one theory, can be arrived at from nothing 
more than the laws of another theory. 
4. Logical or definitional reduction – Reduction from general to specific case of a 
word and vice versa. 
5. Causal reduction – One causal power is explainable in terms of another causal 
power. 
Of these only number 1, 2, 3 and 5 are useful to us, and the logical definitional reduction 
would not apply here. Proponents of emergence usually argue against various kinds of 
reductionism. For example, P.W. Anderson argues that while he holds ontological 
reductionism to be true, he argues against theoretical reduction in science, in the sense 
that there are various methodologies and theoretical tools that are needed and used at 
the different scientific levels, although they are essentially nothing more than the thing 
they consist of, ontologically speaking. He posits a kind of hierarchical structure of 
science, because ‘The elementary entities of science X obeys the laws of science Y’ 
(Anderson, 2008, s. 222). Solid state or many-body physics obeys the laws of elementary 
particle physics, cell biology obeys the laws of molecular biology, all the way up to that 
psychology obeys the laws of physiology and social sciences obey the laws of psychology 
(Anderson, 2008). 
Non-reducibility as a characterization for emergence is for the above reasons a very 
attractive proposition. But is not so readily used as non-derivability is, because of the 
problems that come with the downward causation non-reducibility entails, as we will see 




2.1.4 Additional characterizations 
Lastly, it is important to recognize that this is not necessarily a two-level hierarchical 
structure. Emergent properties can emerge upon other emergent properties, depending 
on the scope of assessment. You could argue that H2O has emergent properties that 
neither the single hydrogen, or neither of the two oxygen atoms have on their own, like 
its ability to quench human thirst. Meanwhile a huge body of water, has different 
properties from a single H2O molecule, like the ability of having a boat float on it. This 
example is not meant to argue the for or against of water as an emergent property, but 
simply to give a clearer picture of layered emergent properties. 
In summary, emergent properties should be unpredictable, causally non-reducible and 
novel, in varying degree according to the type of emergence we’re hunting, but these are 
the general hallmarks. Even though the concept of emergence, like many other terms in 
philosophy, is a rather slippery one, I hold that this sums up the general requirements for 
emergence, although I admit there being variation. 
2.1.5 Types of Emergence 
A lot of the variation in what counts as emergent comes down to the strength one 
requires of the fulfillment of the conditions we have discussed, rather than the difference 
in conditions. Mark A. Bedau suggests separating between three degrees of emergent 
strength: nominal, weak and strong emergence (Bedau, 2008, p. 158), while Andrew 
Assad and Norman H. Packard provides us with at least three: Weakly emergent, 
strongly emergent and maximally emergent (Assad & Packard, 2008), while staying open 
to the possibility of more intermediate definitions. The three being approximately 
analogous to the other (Nominal emergence for Bedau being roughly equivalent to Weak 
emergence for Assad and Packard and so on), but with slight but crucial differences in 
definition. I will go by the naming scheme proposed by Bedau, and treat the definitions 
of Assad and Packard and later David Chalmers as alternate versions of Bedaus 
definition, to keep the language consistent. 
The nominal version of emergence, in Bedau’s definition, is a broad sense of the 
concept, ranging from mere aggregate resultants, but also encompassing properly 
emergent phenomena. Nominal emergence applies to any phenomena that cannot be a 
micro property.  These nominal emergent phenomena are usually philosophically 
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uninteresting and straightforward, like the fact that two individual shoes, make up a pair 
of shoes, even though none of the shoes had the quality of being a pair on their own. 
This kind of emergence is dependent on the lower level properties, but is still 
autonomous from them in the sense that the lower level properties do not share the 
emergent properties. This is the weakest form of emergence of this definition. On the 
other hand, Assad and Packard view the most basic kind of emergence to be when 
“Behavior is deducible in hindsight from the specification after observing the behavior” 
(Assad & Packard, 2008, s. 232). So, in their understanding, it would be a system that is 
surprising, but still fundamentally rule following, so that we can presumably make good 
inferences about the systems behavior after observing it. 
To filter out the properly emergent from the merely resultant or aggregates, we need to 
tighten the net of conditions somewhat. Weak emergence describes those cases where 
the supposedly emergent phenomena is different in kind from its component parts; that 
is that the condition of novelty is strong to such a degree that it is not a result of mere 
aggregability (ref). The definition of weak emergence is one that fluctuates somewhat, 
relative to the definitions of nominal and strong emergence. Weak emergence simply 
includes the cases that are properly emergent, but not strongly emergent. The most 
important aspect of both Bedau’s, and Assad and Packard’s definitions of weak 
emergence (what Assad and Packard call strong emergence), is the level of non-
derivability that is found in these cases. For all of them, weakly emergent phenomena are 
phenomena that are immensely challenging to deduce, while still being theoretically 
derivable. As mentioned earlier, Bedau’s definition of weak emergence only allows for 
one type of derivability, and that is by simulation (Bedau, 2008, ss. 161-164), while Assad 
and Packard doesn’t specify it further than it being “prohibitively difficult” (Assad & 
Packard, 2008, s. 232). 
Strong emergence is, as the name implies, the kind of emergence which demands the 
most of its conditions. It is so stringent in fact, that a lot of the debate on strong 
emergence revolves around whether there are any phenomena that are properly strong at 
all. According to Bedau, strong emergence are cases of emergent phenomena that are 
properly emergent, while still being causally autonomous. They are “[…] supervenient 
properties with irreducible causal powers.” (Bedau, 2008). In addition, they are non-
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derivable in the most stringent sense. One aspect that both weak and strong accounts of 
emergence might share, that we’ve not yet touched upon, is supervenience. Kim makes a 
compelling case of why supervenience should be admitted as a clear constituent of any 
emergent phenomena. He argues that supervenience simply implies that emergence has 
upward necessitation, in that it states that if two different sets are alike in their lower 
level properties, they will be alike in their higher-level properties. Kim puts it in explicit 
terms like so: 
Supervenience: if property M emerges from properties N1,…,Nn, then M supervenes 
on N1,…,Nn. That is to say, systems that are alike in respect of basal conditions, 
N1,…,Nn must be alike in respect of their emergent properties. (Kim, Emergence: Core 
ideas and issues, 2006, p. 550) 
It is important to note that this does not necessarily imply that the supervenient 
connection is a causal one, it could be statistical or stochastic, but that the supervenient 
condition needs to be fulfilled. The reason for this is that without this kind of 
supervenient relation, the relationship between lower level properties and higher level 
ones, would be rather dubious. If the higher order phenomena do not necessarily occur, 
when its lower level enabling properties occur, who is to say that the former emerges 
from the latter, and not from something else? Therefore, there are strong reasons to 
believe a good theory of emergence must include a supervenient relation between the 
higher and lower level. This does not exclude multiple realizability, because the 
supervenience claim only is not an if and only if statement, and the consequent can be 
realized without the antecedent being realized, but not the other way around. The 
supervenience characterization of emergence point is not uncontested, as expected, 
because it proves problematic through the famous causal exclusion problem that we will 
investigate later. If accepted, this supervenience view of emergence would be a part of an 
alternate definition of emergence. Kim defines emergence this way, but in addition to 
supervenience he argues that emergence is also unpredictability. Here we return to his 
argument that we discussed earlier, where a negative characterization might be a 
problematic one. 
Finally, there is sometimes made a distinction between ontological emergence and epistemic 
emergence. The former variant being one that claims that these emergent properties are 
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actual entities in a metaphysical sense, separate from its lower level. The latter tries to 
hold back judgements about the ontological nature of emergent phenomena, and rather 
regard them just as emergent, because they seem emergent. The epistemic view is the 
more dominant in modern debates, and most if not all the accounts of emergence 
covered here are epistemic (Bedau, P.W. Anderson, Chalmers etc. all have epistemic 
views). The shift from the ontological to the epistemic is partially the use for emergence 
in science, and partly because of the failures of the British Emergentists.  
We will explore whether there are any good cases of strong emergence in section 2.2.2, 
but before we do, let us again turn to weak emergence. This kind of emergence does not, 
according to Bedau, require irreducible causal powers, but it remains supervenient and is 
unpredictable (Bedau, 2008).  Bedau goes even further with his analysis, concluding that 
weak emergence is “Underivability Except by Simulation” (Bedau, 2008). This means 
that weak emergence is not “shortcut-predictable”; that there are no epistemic shortcuts 
in predicting the resultant emergence, other than running the case scenario, step by step. 
The clearest example of a possible emergent system with no shortcuts is cellular 
automata, to which we will return shortly. 
2.2 The scope of application 
A question in need of answering, that has already been touched upon in the 
introduction, is what cases are eligible for emergent phenomena. After all, the kinds of 
phenomena we want to describe bears a lot of the motivation for the whole project of 
emergence in the first place. We should strive to designate as many type cases of possible 
emergent as either emergent or non-emergent as we can. As I alluded to in the previous 
section, cellular automata are a huge contender for harboring weakly emergent 
phenomena. Even if this is disputable, it certainly is the paradigmatic case of weak 
emergence in a closed system. When investigating strong emergence, however, the 
dominant case in point is the mind body relation. Specifically, that the mental emerges 
on the physical. 
In addition to the question of what cases might be emergent, there are some other, 
broader questions relating to its scope. Some of these are: What kind of entities can be 




2.2.1 Weak Emergence in Cellular Automata 
Cellular automata are a primarily abstract group of theoretical machines with a specific 
mode of operation. They are cell-based, and each cell follows certain rules according to 
the state of its neighboring cells. The term is used for a wide group of these kinds of 
systems, but in the literature, it most often refers to a two dimensional, two value cellular 
automata. This means that they operate on a two-dimensional board of n-size, like that 
of a chessboard, and that the cells have two states, on and off. These cells toggle on and 
off, per the state of their neighbors, following a finite set of rules. The most famous set 
of rules, are those set up by John Conway in 1970. This notorious zero-player game is 
called The Game of Life. Let us go through the functionality of this game, and then 
explore the case for weak emergence in this closed system. 
As mentioned, this game requires a board, specifically a two-dimensional lattice. Each 
square on the lattice can be either alive or dead. The rules for the game of life are as 
follows: 
Game of Life A living cell remains alive if and only if either two of its neighbors were 
alive at the previous moment; a dead cell becomes alive if and only if exactly three of its 
neighbors was alive at the previous moment (Bedau, 2008, p. 166). 
These rules are essentially a programmatic update function, repeated for every time step. 
Using the definition of the board and the rules of the game, we can start a game by 
giving the game its initial conditions, like in the first frame (T0) of Figure 1. For each 
frame, then, we can calculate which cells will be born, die, keep living and keep being 
dead. Keep doing this to see the game playing out. Even though it probably wouldn’t be 
a hit game to bring on rainy camping trips, it is interesting to explore the behavior of the 
game under different circumstances. 
A lot of the initial configuration of cells in this game, just leads to a short fizzle of 
energy, and then it dies out, with no remaining living cells. Other configurations lead to 
endless repeating patterns, the same cells blinking in and out of existence ad infinitum. 




 There are a lot of repeating local patterns that occur with certain behavior, like the one 
in Figure 1, which incidentally has been dubbed a “glider” by the Game of Life 
community (Yes, there is a Game of Life community). It is called a glider because it 
repeats itself, but only after shifting its position 1x1 on the lattice (in this case south 
east), as though it’s gliding through the frame. 
 
FIGURE 1: THE EVOLUTION OF SET OF CELLS, FROM T0 TO T4 
You could make a glider that moved in three other diagonal directions. There are plenty 
of other repeating patterns in a lot of configurations of the Game of Life, some that 
interact with others in peculiar ways. Take the so called “Eater” in Figure 2, going from 
the leftmost T0 forwards, we see a configuration of cells, and a glider approaching it. 
When they collide, there is some commotion, but after all is said is done, the glider is 
destroyed, but the eater remains, no worse for wear. It’s easy to see where the Game of 
Life got its name from, because not only are the cells “alive” and “dead”, but there is 
some sort of circle of life going on in this strange plane of existence4. 
 
FIGURE 2: A GLIDER BEING DEVOURED BY AN EATER, FROM T0 TO T4 
There are some notable features of this system. First, it is capable of computation. One 
could devise a Turing machine using this system, and thereby, per the Church-Turing 
                                              
4 The vocabulary of the Game of Life is betraying at least the hope of finding proper emergent 
phenomena here. Indeed, the people who mastered the art of identifying entities in Life like the glider 




thesis, it can compute any solvable algorithmic problem (Bedau, 2008, s. 167). So, it 
seems that we have at least one good contender property for emergence, this systems 
computability, or even more interestingly it could play any game a computer can play, 
like chess. Another feature of cellular automata in general, is that they are unpredictable. 
This means that for any distribution of live cells on the Game of Life lattice, the only 
way of deductively predicting the outcome of this after Tn time-steps, is to do the 
calculation, step by step, n times. There is, however, a layer of predictability to this. 
Daniel Dennett points out that if we do an “ontological shift” upward from the world of 
cells, and to the world of gliders and eaters, we can do some predictions (Dennett, 2008, 
s. 201). Seeing that the glider is a repeating pattern, we can assume that it will keep 
repeating ceteris paribus. If there is an eater in the way of a glider, then we can predict 
that the glider is going to be destroyed when they meet, like in Figure 2. These kinds of 
predictions are vulnerable to faulty reasoning, not considering all the factors, and 
incomplete knowledge of the dynamics of these entities. But on the level of cells, there is 
no predicting of this kind. There is only prediction by simulation, with the consequence 
being that you cannot theoretically predict an outcome, before you simulate or observe 
the outcome. It is understandable why thinkers like Mark Bedau gives this feature a lot 
of weight in his understanding of weak emergence. It is close to pure theoretical 
unpredictability. A real-world analogy would be to say that if the lottery numbers are 
predictable only in the case that every possible causal aspect of the future lottery draw is 
accounted for in a simulation, then they are in essence, unpredictable. 
“To say that their salience is considerable is to say that one can, with some small risk, 
ascend to this design level, adopt its ontology, and proceed to predict—sketchily and 
riskily—the behavior of larger configurations or systems of configurations, without 
bothering to compute the physical level.” (Dennett, 2008, s. 199). 
So, we can have different levels of description, on different levels of ontological 
consideration, with different modes of prediction. 
Lastly, a feature of Cellular Automata that is important for us to consider is that they are 
divergent and convergent. The convergence means that there are different initial 
conditions that lead to the same, or inseparably similar results. This in turn makes it, in 
most cases, impossible to go backwards from some stage Tn, and reason our way to the 
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original conditions. If our universe was a cellular automaton, we would not be able to 
reason our way back to the big bang. If we again turn our ontological heads upward, to 
the level of gliders and eaters, dubbed the “design level” by Dennett, we could do some 
reasoning based on our knowledge of the entities on this level and their interactions. We 
could assume that if a glider was all there was in a system, that if we go back in time it 
was moving backwards, but since gliders can appear from non-glider configurations, we 
would make these predictions on shaky grounds. The divergence, similarly, shows itself 
when we have two extremely similar configurations, that because of the seemingly 
insignificant difference, has widely different outcomes after some timesteps Tn. This 
tells us that there is a degree of chaos in cellular automata, as this kind of divergence is 
known as the chaotic “butterfly effect” in popular culture. What this means in terms of 
emergence, though, is that the waters for predicting and reducing, is further muddied, 
showing us the difficulty to predict systems, even if we predict it on the “design level”. 
Can we then find evidence of a type of weak emergence in the Game of Life then? As I 
have covered, it seems to show behavior on higher levels, that it does not display on the 
lower level. For instance, you could configure a system that plays chess, like any other 
sufficiently powerful computer with the required program could, but the individual cells 
cannot. The (highly theoretical) ability to play chess, is not predictable through other 
means than prediction or inference on a higher ontological level, or by simulation. 
Lastly, this system would not be readily reducible, in the way that we could infer our way 
from the chess playing, to how the machine works on a cell basis, because such a 
machine is multiply realizable. Weak emergence, at least initially, can be found in cellular 
automata, so long as we accept unpredictability except by simulation as a valid form of 
unpredictability. 
2.2.2 Strong Emergence of the Mental and the Sparse view 
The patterns we get in cellular automata are surprising, but they are derivable, strictly 
speaking. If they were not, then they would be strongly emergent. It is David Chalmers’ 
view that the biggest difference between weak and strong emergence is that weak 
emergence is in principle derivable from the lower level, but surprising, while the strong 
is underivable even in theory (Chalmers, 2006, s. 244). The stringency of this definition 
can lead us to think that there are no emergent phenomena that can truly be “strong”. 
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This view is called a sparse view of emergence. If emergence exists, the sparse view says 
that it is either an exceedingly rare, or nonexistent phenomena. 
But there is one paradigmatic case of strong emergence, and that is the phenomena of 
consciousness, as an emergent property of the physical base, the body. David J. 
Chalmers holds that this is the one and only case of strong emergence (Chalmers, Strong 
and Weak Emergence, 2006). A system is conscious for Chalmers, ‘when there is 
something it is to be that system’ (Chalmers, Strong and Weak Emergence, 2006, s. 246). 
He does not, in my reading, explicitly deny the possibility of other strongly emergent 
properties, but does not expect there to be any other either. The reason for this is that 
consciousness is the only thing we know about which is demonstrably different from 
physical things. It is not controversial to state that (almost) no matter what stance you 
might have on the relationship between consciousness and the body, there is a difference 
in being a something without consciousness than it is being something that has 
consciousness. Chalmers argues this positions through a couple of, by now, well known 
arguments. The first is Frank Jacksons thought experiment of Mary the super-scientist 
(Jackson, 1982). The argument states that there are phenomena related to consciousness, 
like the perception of color and pain, that are not deducible from perfect knowledge of 
physical facts, even though they might correlate (supervene). The other is Chalmers’ own 
zombie argument: there is no logical impossibility in a physical identical world to our 
world, would have no mental features in it (Chalmers, 1996), (Chalmers, 2006, p. 247). 
The ‘people’-equivalent in this world would then amount to nothing but non-conscious 
zombies. 
It is useful to remember that a view that there exist strongly emergent phenomena, and a 
view that there are weakly emergent phenomena, are in no way mutually exclusive. The 
definitions of strong emergence are usually weak emergence plus something else. In the 
case of Chalmers, weak emergence plus actual strict non-derivability. Because of this, an 
account of strong emergence entail weak emergence, but not the other way around. 
2.2.3 Downward Causation 
Downward causation is one of the most hotly contested points of debate in emergence 
theory. Because emergence theorists require emergent phenomena to be novel and 
causally autonomous, it not only opens for, but requires the possibility of higher level 
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phenomena causing same level, or lower level phenomena, without us being able to trace 
that causality back to the lower-level phenomena that the higher-level emergence upon. 
Armed with downward causation, emergence can provide a lot more explanatory power, 
and motivation for needing emergence in scientific theory in the first place. If downward 
causation is a real aspect of emergence, it provides higher order phenomena with causal 
autonomy, so that to properly explain the causal relations in nature, we need something 
like a concept of emergence to do so. 
As the paradigmatic case in point for downward causation, the claim that the mental can 
have causal effects on the physical is one that is accepted by philosophers such as Ellis 
(Ellis, 2006, s. 102). Human decision-making is an oft-cited case where the mental state 
of wanting to do something, is taken to be what causes the action of doing that 
something. My mental state of wanting to pick up a pen, causes me to pick up a pen. My 
preference for hotdogs causes me to choose to buy a hotdog in favor of a hamburger, 
and so on. This kind of causal efficacy for higher level properties, in this case the mental, 
is often regarded as a characteristic of emergence in itself (Kim, Making Sense of 
Emergence, 2008, s. 141).  
In physics, downward causation is also a discussed problem. If you have some complex 
interaction, where the whole seems to change how the low-level interactions, some 
theoretical problems appear. Paul C. W. Davies frames it this way: 
 “How can wholes act causatively on parts if all interactions are local? Indeed, from the 
viewpoint of a local theory, what is a ‘whole’ anyway other than the sum of the parts?” 
(Davies, 2006, p. 40) 
He regards this kind of ‘whole-part causation’ to be different from the kind of ‘level 
entanglement’ of the mind body relation (Davies, 2006, pp. 41-43). For the whole-part 
causation, it is the kind of causal explanatory view of saying that a ball rolling down a 
hill, causes the individual parts of the ball to spin around. Davies remarks that this is a 
sort of quasi-autonomy where the downward causation is trivial, because the ball is not 
causing the atoms it consists of to act in a certain way, this system is perfectly 
understandable by only its local interactions. The causation is best understood the other, 
more traditional way, that forces are acted on interconnected parts in such a way that a 
whole is perceived. The same goes for whirlpools and other phenomena that seem to 
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have a holistic feature that is not represented in the atomic parts, but that is completely 
derivable. In the emergent vocabulary, these phenomena would be best described as 
nominally emergent, although Bedau seems to regard them as weakly emergent, and 
non-derivable except by simulation (Bedau, 2008, p. 177). 
The other kind of downward causation, level-entanglement as Davies dubs it, and is 
more related to the conceptual levels. Both mental causing physical and software causing 
hardware are cited as examples (Davies, 2006, p. 42). It is not as though we think that 
there are any new physical forces acting from the mental to the physical, or from the 
software to the hardware, none of the actions caused on the lower level from the higher 
level are insufficiently explained from the lower level conditions. Rather Davies thinks 
that this kind of downward causation is a case of “[…] the global system harnesses 
existing local forces.” (Davies, 2006, p. 43). He likens it to a computer with an attached 
robot arm, which can more freely dependent on the software that controls it. If the 
software tells it to move the robot arm over its own circuitry, making changes, the 
software will effectively have caused a change in the hardware, in a sort of software-
hardware feedback exchange (Davies, 2006, p. 43). Whether any of these are truly 
representative of downward causation, is not a given, as other accounts, like the one 
given by Bedau, does not consider the whole-part causation type to be as trivial from the 
lower-level as Davies does. 
There are even further complexities in taking on downward causation, as Kim suggests 
that we should separate between two accounts of downward causation; synchronic 
downward causation, and diachronic downward causation, both of which are reflexive. 
The two are separated by their differences in time relation between cause and effect, the 
former being instantaneous and the latter having a delay. The reflexivity just means that 
the causal relation is a two-way street, the lower causing the higher, and the higher 
causing the lower. The mind body relation is surely a diachronic relation, as the time 
scale for the mental cause and the physical effect is the same. It is not as though we do 
the mental act of pulling a lever, and then the pulling of the lever happens after, if it is 
anything, it is simultaneous. 
George F.R. Ellis also makes a case for downward causation in his model, that we will 
discuss in further detail in section 2.2.1, in a sort of trivial way. He gives an example of 
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an emergent computer system, where you can have same-level actions in the operating 
system. His point is that these same-level operations can be regarded in their own right, 
without referring to the lower level computation, because "it can be analyzed without 
knowledge of the underlying lower-level interactions" (Ellis, 2006, s. 89). My take on this is that 
he's not really talking about top down, or same level action. He is talking about top 
down descriptions, and same level descriptions. That is that the model works without 
the assumption of lower level parts. Describing things in this manner, gives us the 
opportunity to use shorthand in science, to abstract away from lower level and achieve 
clarity in describing the phenomenon a certain descriptive level. As he writes: 
"1024 nuclei and the associated electrons moved simultaneously in a coordinated manner 
so as to decrease the volume available to 1024 gas molecules', which requires about 1036 
bits of information for a full description, actually describes the phenomenon ‘the piston 
moved and compressed gas’. Indeed, this is the reason that we develop and use higher-
level language and mathematical descriptions in the first place." (Ellis, 2006, s. 89) 
It seems that same level causality, for Ellis, occurs when you don't have to invoke lower 
levels principles to explain something. In other words, when it safe to ignore the lower 
level properties. If we look at the higher level, we can safely ignore the lower level, 
because the system is perfectly coherent without it, and sometimes, like in the example 
Ellis gives, way more coherent. While it's undoubtedly true that you could coherently 
describe a car without going into details about the chemistry of fuel or metallurgy of the 
chassis or the engineering of the engine, these aspects are not actually causally impotent, 
just because we ignore it when analyzing the reasons of a car crash. These factors played 
their part, but the police can safely ignore it in their investigation. Instead of attributing 
this to emergence, or downward causation, it could be explained by contextual language. 
Removing irrelevant factors from the equation, is an important technique of critical 
assessment. I do not think that this same-level coherence of explanation, is 
interchangeable with proper downward causation. 
Although the application of downward causation in emergent properties lends it some 
hefty explanatory power, it also comes with some issues. The most famous argument 
against it in philosophical debate might be Jaegwon Kim’s variant of the exclusion 
argument, in which he argues that downward causation does not provide higher order 
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properties with the causal autonomy that it supposes. The problem, is comes about 
because of the relationship between the lower and the higher-level properties. If we have 
some higher order property M2, acts causally on some lower level property, say P, we 
would have downward causation. However, as Kim points out, M being an emergent 
property cannot be so with being reliant on having instantiated base properties. 
Therefore, to instantiate M2, we first need to instantiate its lower level properties M1. 
What then, stops us from saying that M2 did not really cause P, rather it was caused by 
M1, because M2 could not be instantiated without M1. On this argument, the higher-
level property, M2, become causally inefficient, something of an epiphenomenon. This 
would be disastrous for any emergent theory that aims to have causally autonomous 
emergent properties, or even emergent properties that should be accounted for in a 
causal theory at all. Because not only is M2 not causally efficient, but the causal model 
works perfectly fine without it. We could just say that M1 causes P, one the grounds of 
transitivity. The other option is that both M1 and M2 causes P, which would be 
overdetermination.  
Hong Yu Wong challenges Kim’s causal exclusion argument by saying that an 
emergentist may still choose systematic overdetermination, concluding that Kim 
therefore must condemn it, because it is coherent with emergentism (Wong, 2010, s. 13). 
Whether or not downward causation can survive the causal exclusion problem, it 
remains a big part of the language used to describe emergence. 
Downward causation and the exclusion argument are not of significant importance for 
my later argument, other than being a different argument that echo my reservations. But 
still it remains a very central concept to emergence, a concept which in many ways 
defines it. If we can allow for downward causation, without resulting in problematic 
epiphenomenon like Kim suggest it does, it will greatly strengthen the claims about 
emergent causal autonomy and its non-reductive property. 
2.3 The Case for a Layered Nature 
One of my main points of contention with the emergentist position is whether there is 
any good reason to assume that the ontological layers that emergence suggests, exists at 
all, or if it is useful enough that it could reasonably be employed, regardless of its 
ontological status. We could imagine a state of the world where we have pragmatically 
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good grounds to accept that nature is layered, or at least that our model of nature should 
be, even in the case that it is not. This gives us reason to investigate both the case for the 
truth of such a layered nature, and what it would look like, as well as its usefulness. 
I consider an emergent view of science to imply anti-reductionism, although this is not 
always a conceded point. To show why I believe this to be true, we first need to explain 
what is meant by reduction.  
Anderson also holds that this kind of reductionism does not entail what he calls 
constructionism “The main fallacy in this kind of thinking is that the reductionist 
hypothesis does not by any means imply a “constructionist” one: The ability to reduce 
everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws 
and reconstruct the universe” (Anderson, 2008, s. 222). He argues this is the case, 
because there are macro-structures that are practically impossible to see from the 
perspective of the lower level. This seems to mean you can be both reductionist, and 
have a layered emergent view on special sciences. 
But in general, emergence is anti-reductionist in some sense, because for the special 
sciences to be emergent, they need to be causally separate, and therefore causal reduction 
cannot hold. If this was not true, then the causal powers of phenomena on a social level 
would be determinable from physics, and not something that could be acceptable in a 
theory of emergent science. Emergentists must hold higher order phenomena to be 
causally distinct from its base. 
2.3.1 Outline for an emergent hierarchy of special science 
The view of nature and science as emergent structures, is not one that is extensively 
developed in the main works of emergence, and for my use, does not need to be. I 
would, however, like to try my hand at a simple outline that an emergent structure of 
special sciences would need to have, inferred from other assumptions of emergence, and 
using the few sources I have of similar systems, most notably that of P.W. Anderson 
(2008) and George F.R. Ellis (2006), we will return to these two later. I propose a 
simplified model as consisting of assuming the following: 
1. The most basic special science is physics. 
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2. Each special science starts where the higher order properties of the phenomena 
of the science before it begins, except the most basic level. 
3. The levels all describe different (novel) kinds of phenomena, although they might 
describe the same object(s) they differ in order of complexity. 
When we have these three steps, we only need a working definition of what counts as 
emergent phenomena, and it should effectively divide all natural phenomena neatly into 
being the domain of its respective special sciences. That is, it takes an interpretation of 
emergence, and produces the extension of the different scientific domains. This should 
be true for both ontological and epistemic accounts of emergence. The scientific 
domains that result are emergent sciences, because if the emergentists are right, this 
would be the only proper way of dividing the natural sciences. A natural kind science has 
the scope of complexity of solving scientific problems of a certain kind, with no overlap 
in subject matter with the other natural kind sciences. Different sets of interpretations of 
what constitutes an emergent relationship would produce different divisions of what 
belongs to which special science, as visualized in fig 2.1, with physics, chemistry and 
biology. 
 
In fig 2.1, the first interpretation (I1) is a division of the three special sciences in 
question, that is fairly even, all three having similar scope in number of phenomena 
within its domain. The second interpretation (I2), has a sparser domain of biology and 






















FIG 2.1: DISTRIBUTION OF 
PHENOMENA IN SPECIAL SCIENCE
Domain of Physics Domain of Chemistry Domain of Biology
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physics, but a large domain of chemistry. The third interpretation (T3) is the opposite of 
the second. The models in fig 2.1 is not meant to realistically portray a model of 
scientific hierarchy, or try to reflect any real division in domains, but rather to give an 
indicator to the dynamics of the boundaries that are generated with different 
interpretations of emergence. Neither are any of the interpretations T1, T2 or T3 real 
interpretations. The true model, if there is one, would presumably be more complex, and 
perhaps branching into various areas of science, but this does not affect this discussion 
much, because rather than focusing on what the models look like in the end, I am 
interested in how their internal borders would form, so this basic model only serves the 
purpose of illustrating that. 
The relationship would be such that all phenomena covered by the special science of 
biology would emerge from the phenomena in chemistry, and all chemistry from 
physics. On this view, we exclude the possibility of having an emergent phenomenon 
with lower level and higher level properties being covered by the same domain of special 
science. Such that all emergent phenomena have their base in one special science, and 
the higher level in another. In the case of the game of life then, all the identifiable levels 
of emergence, should be considered members of different special sciences subject 
matter. This might be problematic, because it might produce too many special sciences. 
This could be avoided if we allow for two types of emergence, one that has the base 
level and the higher level in the domain of different special sciences, and one that has 
both in the domain of the same special science. I will however not concern myself with 
this, and assume that all emergent phenomena are of the former kind. 
The different domains of the special sciences that are produced by the definitions of 
emergence, should be non-overlapping, and that the union of the extensions of all the 
special sciences should include every possible phenomenon, on every possible level of 
description. The various levels are also presumable mainly different in levels of 
description, as they can describe the same set of materials. As the borders between the 
domains of the sciences is non-overlapping, it follows that they all have a clear, non-
vague extensions of the phenomena they describe. It would be incoherent to assume that 
we could have domains that covered all phenomena on all levels of descriptions, never 
overlap, but still do not have a clear extension. It is a trivial point that there can be no 
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phenomena on any level of description that is either both a member of a scientific 
domain, and isn’t, or is not a member of any domain. Every phenomenon must be a 
member of one, and only one, special scientific domain on a specific level of description. 
I still have not touched upon whether this emergence of sciences should aim to be a 
weak or a strong emergent, ontological or epistemic, and from the inclusion of a non-
reductionist claim in my definition, this can be taken to mean that I think this emergent 
view of science is or should be a strongly emergent ontological one. I don’t think this is 
the case, because the causal autonomy of higher order phenomena is a requirement for 
both weak and strong emergence, and that causal non-reduction is required to obtain 
this autonomy, I hold that this would be a requirement in both a strong and weak view 
of the emergence of special sciences. 
The requirements for natural kind sciences to be strongly emergent would be its 
underivability, even in theory, from its base. I think a case could be made, and it has 
been made, that some sciences are strongly emergent on others. P.W. Anderson, for 
instance, shows us that in his field of many body physics, it is not possible to derive the 
level of symmetry in a complex chemical system from the physics of its components 
(Anderson, 2008). Supposing this is true5, then we might have a strongly emergent 
relationship between many-bodies physics and chemistry. Although the same kind of 
strong emergent relationship need not be true between say psychology and social 
science. A strongly emergent hierarchy of special science would then probably be sparser 
then a weakly emergent one, because it would probably include fewer relationships as 
emergent. 
In any case, the best course of action is to take weak emergence as the model of 
emergence to use for the purposes of emergent hierarchies. I have two main reasons for 
this. The first is that I think there is good reason to believe, along with Chalmers 
argumentation, that strong emergence would be sparse, and that the only candidate for 
strong emergence is consciousness. If this is the case, then the claim that emergence 
provides us with a hierarchy of phenomena that lines up with the special sciences is 
trivially false, as physics and consciousness are not the two only areas of special science. 
                                              
5 Andersons argument for this is too technical and specific to the field of physics for me to deal with, so I will let it 
stand uncontested. My own argumentation does not rest on its truth. 
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The other reasons are that even if strong emergence did provide us with what we 
needed, our model of how hierarchies are formed, and what they look like, would not 
need to be altered much. This is because strongly emergent phenomena surely also are 
weakly emergent. So, any critique raised against the hierarchies formed by weak 
emergence, can be similarly raised against the hierarchies formed strongly. 
When talking about these layers being emergent upon each other, it is using emergence 
in a slightly different way than when talking about individual emergent phenomena. 
Because, what would it mean that chemistry emerges from physics? Does it have to be 
true that all the properties of chemistry are novel and unpredictable from physics, or just 
that certain hallmarks of chemistry are. Or that the laws of the one, emerge from the 
other. When I say that one special science emerges from another I mean that the 
phenomena being described by that special science, emerge from the properties in the 
special science below. 
The view of science as a series of emergent layers in a hierarchy is fully embraced and 
developed in George F. R. Ellis ‘On the Nature of Emergent Reality’, in which he 
supposes that there is a given structure of special sciences, and that this is emergent. This 
system is first and foremost the hierarchy of natural systems, and the order of the 
sciences is made to match. The difference between this account and that of P.W. 
Anderson is that Ellis suggest that this hierarchy is there in an ontological sense, while 
P.W Anderson only remarks that we could organize science in this way. Ellis puts forward 
the following emergent hierarchy of structure, going from the highest level to the lowest 












These levels have different modes of description, relational hierarchy and 
phenomenology, meaning that we cannot describe the higher-level properties in the 
language of the lower, and vice versa. Politics is not describable on the level of 
description of Cell Biology, Particle Physics in Botany and so on. The characteristics 
Ellis provides for the emergence that produces this kind of hierarchy is not so simple to 
get a hold of, and not very important to get into, but they consist largely of not being 
straight forwardly reducible, meaningful top-down actions and goal seeking system 
properties, all arranged into five different degrees of emergent strength (Ellis, 2006, ss. 
99-100). The reason it is not that important to get into, is that I want to focus this part 
on the hierarchical systems themselves, and not so much the interpretation that provide 
us with them. Ellis’s model is supposed to have clear extensions of the phenomena that 
are included at each level in the hierarchy. The language used to describe the relationship 
between these levels is largely that of computer science, more specifically object oriented 
programming. On Ellis’s model the emergent structures are governed by ‘abstraction, 
encapsulation and inheritance’ (Ellis, 2006, s. 86). A higher order of emergence, is 
something of a higher level of abstraction, such that the lower level details are washed 
away through coarse-graining.  
 An immediate suspicion that can be raised against this kind of model is that it seems to 
take for granted that a lot of the language and methodologies that is used in artificial 
systems such as object oriented programming is applicable to nature in any way greater 
than analogy. The takeaway from Ellis’s approach in the later context of vagueness 
should be that there is a great deal of ontological commitment happening on the 
grounds of methodologies and modeling borrowed from computing and physics. The 
connection between the seeming emergent phenomena we observe, and their ontological 
truth is simply assumed, and the models of computing are used to create sharp divide 
between these levels. 
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S. Rasmussen, N. A. Baas, B. Mayer and M. Nillson gives us a more in depth, yet 
simpler, variant of the kind of emergent hierarchical structure proposed above in their 
“Ansatz for Dynamical Hierarchies”. The aim of their model is more specialized to 
molecular biology, but they do not exclude that it can be a guide to a more general 
hierarchy for other systems of complexity, although they do not claim that it is. In their 
study, they focus on three orders of emergence, from monomer, to polymer to micelle. 
Each having a functional emergent description of their own, as seen in Fig. 3 





These layers of emergence are causally efficient both up and down, the lower level 
functional properties have causal power over the higher level, and the functions on the 
higher-level causes changes in the lower. This, along with the observation that these 
systems are self-organizing, is why they term this hierarchy to be dynamical. Another 
feature worth mentioning about this hierarchy is that it is simulation predictable, and 
part of the project is to recreate these systems in simulations.  
Now the interesting part for our discussion is how this model separates between the 
levels, and the manner of definition about the functional descriptions of the emergent 
properties. The only operational characterization of emergence in their model is that it is 
novel, so this explains why the emergent levels are very dense, because novelty alone is 
an easier condition to satisfy than novelty together with non-derivability and non-
reducibility. The only thing required for emergence here is that it “[…] does not apply at 
any lower level” (Rasmussen, Baas, Mayer, & Nillson, 2008, p. 309), this is then refined 
in an explicit formal definition. 
I think this model reflects the kind of bigger emergent hierarchy that the emergentists 
might want to work, and is the inspiration for my own take on this. The notable 
difference is that the emergence they operate with, is what we could characterize as 
nominal emergence, the weakest sense of emergence possible. If a model of emergent 
FIGURE 3, FROM (RASMUSSEN, BAAS, MAYER, & NILLSON, 2008, P. 324) 
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hierarchies were to reflect some sort of ontological emergence in nature and special 
science, I think it would have to be at least a strong variant of weak emergence for it to 
have the theoretical punch required to justify the model, because a mere nominal 
emergent hierarchy is still both reducible and deducible, and not the kind of paradigm 
shift we would like. I do not hold that these emergent hierarchies are possible in the 
strict sense of them referring to some ontological natural order of special science akin to 
the kind proposed by Ellis, but I see them as in the case of the more limited model 
suggested by Rasmussen et al., as a scientific tool for simulating and understanding 








Chapter Three: Vagueness in emergent hierarchies 
So far, we have discussed the features and issues found in the literature on both 
vagueness and emergence. In the following chapter, however, we will depart from the 
known debates and venture into more unknown territory, with my own application of 
vagueness on emergent theories. Although the suspicion that there is vagueness in 
emergence is not discussed in any depth in the literature, it is still not entirely untouched, 
as both Jaegwon Kim and Mark. A. Bedau acknowledge to some extent that the 
boundaries between higher level and lower level phenomena be vague. The arguments 
that I put forward here, however, have not been put forward before to my knowledge. 
3.1 Vagueness in the characteristics of emergence 
If one has prior knowledge of vagueness when reading about emergence, as I hope 
anyone reading this now has, one might have a nagging question in the back of one’s 
mind. Could emergent phenomena be vague? After all, a lot of the “magic” of 
emergence revolves around that something is suddenly something else. This great 
divergence, as we’ve discussed in chapter two, seems to insinuate the exclusion of 
vagueness. Make a minor change in the right place in a brain, and we might not get 
consciousness at all, suggesting that there is a point where it goes from heap, to non-
heap, in just one seemingly insignificant step in the lower level properties. 
My aim is to show that emergence is vague. To do this, we need to establish vagueness 
in emergences defining characteristics. As established in the first chapter, the most 
common defining features for emergence are non-derivability, novelty and non-
reducibility, in various combinations and levels. Vagueness, as shown in the second 
chapter, is a term that applies to predicates with an unclear extension. If I am right, both 
emergence and its compound features are vulnerable to sorites paradoxes, as they all 
have unclear extensions. Then, by going further, I want to show that emergence is vague, 
because its defining features are vague. Emergent levels generated by emergence are then 
bound to be vague, and emergence is therefore not useful or suitable as a guide to 
layering nature. So, in this chapter I will discuss the alluded vagueness in non-
derivability, novelty and non-reducibility, and lastly the vagueness of emergence itself. 
Lastly, I will show what this means for emergent theory. 
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My investigations into this matter is not an attempt to refute the possibility of emergent 
properties, or reveal some internal inconsistency to the ontology and epistemology of 
them, but rather to show that it is naïve to expect the philosophical analysis of 
emergence to provide us with any ontological or epistemic tools for uncovering what is 
and what isn’t emergent. 
3.1.1 Novelty 
Novelty seems to be the weakest of the possible characteristics of emergence, because it 
is difficult to say that any aggregate, iterative or complex structural property of some 
basic property is not novel. Imagine the following case: we have a set of base features F1 
from which emerges an emergent function description F2 where the description of F2 is 
not identical to F1. This would be a clear case of novel emergent property. For it to be 
untrue, the description of F2 and F1 must be identical. For the novelty of the set of 
properties F2 to be vague, it need to be unclear whether the properties of F2 belongs in 
the extension of “novel from F1”, or “different than F1”. If we think about this in terms 
of cellular automata, a structure made from cells, would have to show features that are 
not present in the lower level. Let us try the sorites method on cellular automata, in the 
form of the repeating question. 
1. Does a single cell in the game of life have novel features that a single cell does 
not have? 
2. Does a system of two cells, arranged next to each other have novel features that a 
single cell does not have? 
The answer to the first question is undoubtedly no, as a single cell should not be able to 
have different properties then itself, all else being equal. The answer to the second 
question though, interestingly, is a bit more debatable. Two cells arranged next to each 
other in the game of life, does have a different functional description than a lone one 
has. For one, they form a line, and not just a point. And no matter how they are 
arranged, you could always draw a straight line between them. This feature is novel in 
the way that is different from the features of only one cell, but it’s a quite mundane 
feature. It’s not like two cells next to each other have consciousness, while the single cell 
does not. The type of novelty is much less radical, the single cell also occupies geometric 
space, but in a less line-ish way that the double configuration does. It does not however 
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have different functionality in the sense that in T1 (Timestep 1), both one cell and a 
system of two cells will be gone, because in the game of life a cell needs two or three 
neighbors to survive to the next timestep, which none of the cells in neither of these 
configurations have. From this, we see that there is no novelty on the “design level” of 
gliders and eaters, merely in the geometric properties of the first timestep. It seems we 
can make the case of it being both weakly emergent (systemic geometric properties) and 
non-emergent (design-level properties), depending on if we view weakly emergent 
phenomena as diachronic, synchronic, and the kinds of differences we require to fulfill 
the condition. If we continue this increment to three: 
3. Can three cells, arranged in any way, have novel features that a single cell does 
not have? 
Here we can observe a similar geometrical novel feature. If you draw lines between 
them, they will form a triangle. But more systemically than that, and on the design level, 
three cells in the game of life is the least number of cells that you could have that can be 
arranged in such a way that they do not immediately die in the next time step. If we 
arrange them closely together, they would, in the next timestep, cause a fourth cell to 
come to life, creating a 2x2 block of cells which then would stay alive forever, assuming 
no other cells encounter it. Or we could arrange them in a line, which would cause it to 
seemingly flip the row in a 90° angle from the middle, even though what happens at the 
cell level is that the cells at the left and right end die, while the cells at the top and 
bottom of the middle cell, get born, while the middle cell survives. This will alternate for 
all foreseeable future, ceteris paribus. So again, we have novelty, in that we have a 
mechanical feature in the game of life. But are these different emergent levels, and are 
they emergent in an equivalent way?  
In fact, it seems that for every step of complexity we add, there will always be novelty. 
This feature of emergence turns out to be extraordinarily weak, in that we can always 
argue that something that is not identical to something else, has novel features, meaning 
different but not identical features. If this is true, then novelty is so weak that it’s 
problematic to find any claim about emergence where the novelty condition is not 
satisfied. Taken like this, we can deem it to general to be problematically vague, as it 
would be like having every number of grains, other than zero, be a heap. 
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But I think that this weakness of definition can relate to the problem of vagueness. For 
novelty to have a proper function in a definition of emergence, it needs to be 
strengthened. To do this, we can specify the kinds of things that count as new. Let’s say, 
in the case of the Game of Life, that we could only like to have layers of description 
about the kinds of functionality that are unique to the Game of life, like the “design 
level” emergence of gliders and eaters, and not other kinds of novelty, like geometrical 
properties and the like. This decision would be useful in clearing up the kinds of 
phenomena that we should investigate in the Game of Life, and exclude the other things 
that are not unique to this system, but it is also an obviously arbitrary decision to include 
the one, and exclude the other, because novelty gives us no such decision-making power 
on its own, as we have seen. The reason for this arbitrariness is the vagueness of the 
specification of our definition of novelty, in this instance, “the kind of functionality that 
are unique to the Game of Life”. The extension of the predicate F, where F is “the kind 
of functionality that is unique to the Game of Life” is unclear, because there are 
borderline cases of it. An instance of a borderline case of F is the kinds of geometrical 
properties that we discussed previously in this section. The phenomena of geometrical 
shape from point based structures is not unique, but the application of it to the Game of 
Life is, and so it remains as not a clear case of F, and neither a clear case of not F. I 
believe that vagueness of specifications of this kind are quite general, and should be 
considered at least partly the reason for the requirement of arbitrary decisions to what 
counts as something, in this case novel, and what doesn’t. 
It should also be noted that the specification of observable properties is somewhat 
arbitrary. This is quite analogous to the arbitrariness involved in the specification of the 
primitive objects and their interactions. So, a certain kind of phenomena can be viewed 
as Nth-order emergent only relative to arbitrary choices about what counts as first-order 
objects and properties, what counts as second order objects and properties, and so 
forth. (Rasmussen, Baas, Mayer, & Nillson, 2008, p. 311) 
This admittance is not of significant importance for their project of dynamical 
hierarchies in molecular biology, because it is used as an epistemic tool for 
understanding structure in nature, and not as an argument for an emergent ontology. We 
should also remember that the only operational characteristic of emergence in this 
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model, is novelty, so this arbitrariness-problem does not imply that more complex 
characterizations with non-derivability, non-reducibility and supervenience have the 
same problem. 
Whether I am right in my suspicions that vagueness help cause this need for arbitrary 
decision-making or not, the condition of novelty for emergent phenomena seem to have 
a two-fold problem. Either the power of the condition is trivially weak, such that every 
phenomenon, except identical ones, are deemed to be emergent. If this is the case then 
novelty is as useless in the definition of emergence, as “being a something” is for 
defining a watch, because they would both be trivially true in every case that matters. Or, 
on the other hand, if we try to make the novelty conditions more rigid, it is bound to be 
too contextually arbitrary for it to be ontologically plausible. 
3.1.2 Non-derivability 
When analyzing the vagueness of unpredictability or non-derivability, we should first 
make sure that our usage of underivability is compatible with the use in emergent 
discussions. One clear case of underivability comes from Mark. A Bedau as mentioned 
in chapter two. This is unpredictability (or underivability as he puts it) except by 
simulation (Bedau, 2008). In this understanding, a phenomenon would be perceived as 
unpredictable from the knowledge of its component parts, in the case that the only way 
of doing so would be to go through with the process, step by step, in a simulation, 
without being able to skip ahead. The other is the strictly non-derivable variant, 
associated with strong emergence. Considering this being a discussion about emergent 
hierarchies, and my position that weak emergence is the more relevant variant of the 
concept in that context, I will focus on non-derivable except by simulation as the core of 
the non-derivability characterization. The industrial strength non-derivability used in 
Chalmers’ strong emergence, is as we have seen, so strong that there is only one case 
that satisfies it, and that is consciousness. Non-derivability to this degree is therefore not 
useful if we want to allow for more variety of emergent phenomena. So, I will rather 
investigate Bedau’s non-derivability in weak emergence. 
To determine if something could be vaguely non-derivable is a challenging task. But a 
good place to start is to try to stress the borders of the terms extension. We have seen 
how this kind of non-derivability works in a cellular automata system, with the only 
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exception to the non-derivability being simulation. An important aspect to investigate is 
what kinds of simulations that are valid exceptions. In the case of cellular automata, the 
simulation is extraordinarily accurate. It is a one -to-one simulation of the exact 
conditions of another cellular automaton. There are no differences in the structure or 
content of the simulation versus the event being simulated. This is not normally the case 
in simulations. Simulations tend to abstract away the unimportant aspects of the process 
and focus on functionality. Often, a lot of processes gets simplified in a simulation, while 
leaving the overall mechanics intact. For instance, if we were to simulate the impact of a 
car crashing into a brick wall. It would not be necessary to simulate all the individual 
molecules that the gasoline consists of, for the purposes of this simulation we only need 
to assume that the car is moving forwards, without concerning ourselves with the 
specific hydrocarbons included in the gasoline mix. 
The kind of simulation proposed by Bedau is more of a duplication rather than a 
simulation. Everything is completely identical, down to the last cell. If we follow through 
with this understanding of simulation, then running a computer program downloaded 
from a website, would be to simulate of the original program. When he talks about 
simulations then, I will take this to mean simulation by duplication. Once we see the 
simulation in this light, a lot of other phenomena can count as being underivable except 
by simulation (by duplication). Deriving the swaying of a tree and its branches in the 
wind from the structure of the trees fibers and the movement of the air around it might 
well be impossible by other means then replicating these exact conditions in a computer 
simulation or in physical form, which might prove to be practically impossible. The 
waving of the branches would also count as a clear case of novelty from the base level, 
and I think also non-reductive, in the emergentist sense. Yet, it does not seem intuitively 
emergent in the strong weak sense that we would like. It might be nominally emergent, 
as that doesn’t take much other than that the waviness of the tree could not be a feature 
of the tree fibers and the environmental conditions, and even this might be wrong. That 
the condition of underivability except by simulation is vague is not lost on Bedau 
however:  
“I have been speaking of underivability except by simulation as if there were a sharp 
dividing line separating weak emergent properties from merely resultant properties, but 
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this is an oversimplification […] One can define various sharp distinctions involving 
underivability except by simulation, but focusing on one to the exclusion of the others is 
somewhat arbitrary” (Bedau, 2008)  
He notes that you can have emergent phenomena that are strictly shortcut-derivable, but 
needs to be simulated, underivable except by finite simulation and underivable except by 
impossible or infinite simulation (Bedau, 2008). 
The vagueness in the non-derivability characterization is not really a case of the actual 
derivability, as in the strict derivability, being especially vague. But if we want to provide 
any special condition to limit the derivability, like “except by simulation”, that is 
connected to the epistemics of derivability, we quickly encounter problems with 
vagueness. The extension of things that are simulatable, is not a clear one, and that rubs 
off on the non-derivability. 
Because of the points mentioned above, I think it is fair to say that defining weak 
emergence in terms of its underivability except by simulation, does not shield it from 
vagueness, on the contrary it seems to invite it in. As this is by far the strongest 
unpredictability theory for weak emergence, I conclude that unpredictability in weak 
emergence is vague. 
3.1.3 Non-reducibility 
The cousin of non-derivability, non-reducibility is a more problematic condition for the 
emergence project overall, because of the exclusion problem (covered in 2.4), and the 
lack of it in weak forms of emergence. As something to guarantee the causal autonomy 
of higher order phenomena, it is supposed to provide emergence with causal efficacy, 
allowing higher order phenomena to provide causality that is separate from its base level. 
Nevertheless, whether there are viable solutions to the causal exclusion of higher order 
properties or not, the non-reducibility characterization is too vague. To show this, we 
first need to disambiguate what type of non-reducibility we are looking for. 
As discussed in 2.1.3, there are multiple ways in which something can be reducible, and 
therefore also non-reducible. I will take the theoretical reducibility to be of most 
importance to us, because it is what provides us with the wall of explanatory separation 
between the different special sciences. We should also consider causal reduction as a 
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strong vain in the scientific theory context that we are focusing in on. To reiterate: causal 
reduction in emergent phenomena is when a higher order causal property is definable in 
terms of its lower level causal properties, just like Kim supposes in his causal exclusion 
argument. Theoretical reduction is when a higher order law or theory, like for instance 
Newtonian physical laws, are reducible to its lower level properties, the laws of quantum 
mechanics. If the higher order law or theory could be removed, without removing any 
theoretical ability, then it is reducible, it is non-reducible if this cannot be done. 
In the case of the first type, causal reduction, is a feature of most accounts of strong 
emergence, but not weak emergence. Bedau’s account of weak emergence does not 
include causal non-reducibility, neither does P.W. Anderson. Yet the latter account is 
represented in both. For the second type, the theoretical, or explanatory reduction, we 
can again turn to Jaegwon Kim for some helpful analysis. In Making Sense of Emergence he 
describes the process of this kind of reduction for the purposes of identifying the 
relation between the base and the emergent property, as we discussed in 2.1.2. To do 
these kinds of functional definitions of emergent properties, we will need to make 
certain definitory decisions based on our, probably inexact, knowledge about it. If we 
have some emergent phenomena E, we must decide where it begins and where it ends, 
for us to make a functional description of it. Let us suppose we have some emergent 
property E from base property P that we need to describe, so that we can work out 
whether E is reducible to P or not. Because E is in some way or other made up of P, our 
description of E should be functional, to separate the two, as I have argued before. The 
systemic properties of P might have many possible functional descriptions, that might be 
variously degrees of emergent on P, and some that are not emergent at all, but we would 
like to isolate a specific emergent property. We then must decide on some cut-off point 
somewhere to include all the aspects of the apparent phenomena properties that belong 
to E, and exclude all the ones that do not, based on our best knowledge. These decisions 
are based on what we want to explain, the scientific context and our current knowledge, 
but to some extent also arbitrary. Kim acknowledges this point: 
“We should keep in mind that such conceptual decisions can be and often are based on 
empirical knowledge, knowledge of the causal/nomic relations in which E is embedded, 
and can be constrained by theoretical desiderata of various sorts, and that in practice the 
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boundary between what’s conceptual and what isn’t is certain to be a vague and shifting 
one.” (Kim, Making Sense of Emergence, 2008, s. 133). 
After these decisions are made, we can see if this functionalization D of E is reducible to 
P. The role of vagueness in this model is easy to see. When giving the emergent 
phenomena some functional name, we imply a certain, probably vague, extension of 
phenomena to be included in this definition. If we take the glider in the cellular automata 
as an example. Our functional definition of the emergent property realized by a certain 
initial condition, could be that it moves diagonally in some direction, depending on the 
orientation of the glider. This is not the full extent of its causal powers though, as it can 
also interact with other configurations of cells in a practically infinite number of 
variations (it can collide with a x configuration at y place in z time etc.). All of these 
should not be included, as mentioned before, but some of them probably should. The 
extension then, of “the function of E” is very unclear, and thusly vague, which is why we 
must take the context of our specific investigation and other desiderata into account, for 
us to make it a viable functional definition, but these are in a very real ontological sense, 
arbitrary, based on our interests as observers. I want to underline the point that it is not 
just the case that the extension of “the functions of E” is incredibly large and unwieldy, 
although it certainly is that. We have no way of knowing, without it being arbitrary, 
whether “if a glider meets an eater in this configuration, at this place in t234” should be 
included in its extension or not. 
This point also goes for the previous sections on novelty and non-derivability, as the 
functional description of the emergent property is required in all three characterizations, 
to define or encapsulate what the emergent property consists of. To work out whether 
something is a novel property of something else, we first need to establish the functional 
description of the thing that is supposed to be novel, as well as the description of the 
thing it needs to be different than. The process of describing or defining emergent 
properties lays bare its inherent vagueness, as the emergent phenomena we observe have 
vague extensions of what is included in the phenomena and what isn’t. 
3.2 Vagueness in emergent levels  
Following my claims of vagueness, there are some problems that must be accounted for. 
The version of dividing complex phenomena into the domain of different special 
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sciences that I gave in chapter 3, is one that aims to produce specific extensions. If you 
have an interpretation S1, it needs to produce a hierarchy of phenomena that have no 
borderline cases to be useful, because it separates between the extensions of the special 
sciences with emergence, producing no overlap in their domains. So, no matter the 
interpretation of emergence we are operating with, the aim is for it to produce non-
vague extensions of the domains of the special sciences. It is crucial that these borders 
can be clear. 
I have shown that all the prominently featured characteristics of weakly emergent 
properties are vague, and therefore I hold weak emergence to be itself vague. This point 
is more general than just being about a specific set of defining characteristics of weak 
emergence being vague, like for instance Bedau’s underivable except by simulation 
(Bedau, 2008), or Chalmers derivable but surprising condition (Chalmers, Strong and 
Weak Emergence, 2006). Both of these, along with every other configuration of 
characteristics of weak emergence, will be vague, because dividing up phenomena in the 
way that they attempt to do, invariably produce unclear borders. 
The core problem, that causes vagueness to be a recurring issue in the definition of 
emergence, is that the whole concept of emergence revolves around its divergence, 
which is the same place the sorites paradoxes get their confusing nature from. Take the 
Turing-machine that has been created in the Game of Life. This construction, is realized 
by the exact nature of its base properties. If we remove only one cell, a fraction of a 
fraction of the whole puzzle, the contraption fails, and the universal computer stops 
emerging. The system will still have a lot of other high level features, like eaters and 
gliders on the design level, but this more impressive computing feature is gone. When 
we try to identify the difference of the system S that contains a universal Turing-
machine, and the system S-1 that contains a universal Turing-machine, minus one piece 
(assuming all the pieces are essential for the machine to function), we naturally think that 
there must be a major change in the nature of the system from S to S-1, because how 
else could such a substantial change on the high level come from so little a difference on 
the low. Suddenly, it stops being a heap, so to speak. 
The strongest reason to consider emergence to be vague is that the functionalization 
process that is required to deal with these lower and higher level properties is inherently 
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vague, as discussed in 3.1.3, so no ontological, nor epistemic clarity should be expected 
to come of the process. This shows us that while the vagueness is the emergent 
characterizations are relatively mild, the vagueness related to the higher order 
phenomena themselves is inescapable. While identifying which phenomena in the world 
are emergent and which are not, seems quite simple and intuitive, the formalization 
process is not as simple. It is when we try to determine the true extension of some causal 
prowess or functional property of a glider in the game of life, or a school of fish moving 
in unison, that we realize that the emergence is not so easily captured. 
Going back to the case of special science: it is quite clear that if we have no non-arbitrary 
way of determining the extension of emergent phenomena, it will be impossible to 
determine what phenomena pertains to the different special sciences, merely on the 
grounds of emergence. The hope was that with a rigid system of emergent levels, we 
could be able to allow for a specific extension of the domains of the special sciences, on 
different interpretations of emergence. But if the vagueness of emergence, as I have 
argued, is not specific to any definition, but rather to the definition/decision process of 
what the higher-order property is, then this would be impossible on any interpretation. 
Seeing as the vagueness is inherent in the process of identifying emergent, such a non-
vague scientific hierarchy of emergent levels will not be possible, and therefore will every 
interpretation of emergence, yield vague levels. The consequence is quite clear, we 
cannot have a hierarchy of special science based on emergence, if that system requires 
clear extensions. Either we must do away with the requirement of clear extensions of the 
levels, or reject with the idea altogether. 
3.2.1 Criticism 
There are several possible critiques that could be raised against my collected arguments 
against emergence that I would like to discuss. As I see it there are four main lines one 
could take:  
Rejecting functional descriptions of emergent properties. As I have shown, the process of 
formalizing emergent properties in terms of its functional content is problematic because 
it involves arbitrary cutting off fuzzy borders. This seems to be solvable by changing our 
model of descriptions for emergent properties, or simply specifying what kinds of 
functional descriptions we require, in a non-arbitrary way. 
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If we don’t want to change our model of description, but simply try to amend the 
weaknesses of the functional one, I think an effective way to start would be to narrow 
down the kinds of functionalities that we want to include in our description of an 
emergent property. The root of the problem is that there is no non-arbitrary way of 
discriminating the kind of functional description we want, and one that is too large. We 
could give a much stronger definition like this: ‘The functional definition of an emergent 
property should include all the properties that allow us to derive all of the emergent 
properties causal relations, and no more’. Defined like this, we exclude all the relational 
and causal functions that bloated up our first definition. In the case of the glider in the 
cellular automata that we used before, the functional description would be something 
like the movement of the glider, plus the placement of every cell in all the time-steps of a 
gliders four phases. Armed with some formalization of these, we can work out all the 
possible interactions with other configurations, if we know their functional description. 
There are several problems with this model, though. The first is that the interactions of 
the system are no more derivable from our new functional description, than the 
emergent property is from the base conditions. This being a cellular automaton, the 
interaction between one functional model and another is still non-derivable except by 
simulation. Also, this definition would essential allow us to ditch the whole functional 
aspect, we could merely include the second part with the placement of all the cells in the 
four phases of the glider, which is essentially the base condition for the emergent 
property. If we dismiss non-derivability except by simulation it would further lead us to 
not being able to discriminate between what counts as the base property of the glider, 
and what counts as the emergent. In the end, we are left with more problems than we 
started with. 
Even though my reply to this is specific to a specification of the functionalization 
process that has not been proposed by anyone as far as I know, I think the points we 
can draw from it remain valid. It is very problematic to specify what counts as an 
emergent function without it being arbitrary or dependent on out investigative interests. 
The linguistic critique about the vagueness of the process has no bearing on the ontological truth of 
emergent layers in nature or special science. This objection can safely be bundled together with 
the claim that if we a consistent account of epistemic vagueness, my reservations about 
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emergent levels should dissipate. Objections of this kind are valid, in some sense, but I 
think misses the point of my argument. I am not arguing that because of the inherent 
linguistic vagueness in defining and using these terms to refer to specific non-vague 
emergent phenomena and basal relations, that these relations cannot exist. Rather my 
argument says that we have no reason to think that they do, and even if they did, we 
have very good reasons to think that our theoretical understanding of the phenomena 
would reveal them to us. 
If we attempt to solve our theoretical difficulties by accepting epistemic vagueness à la 
Timothy Williamson, I think the theoretical power this provides would be somewhat 
disappointing. Even though, in an epistemic view, there such a thing as bivalence, and 
every proposition is metaphysically speaking, always true or false, vagueness is still 
prevalent in conceptual representation (Williamson, 1994, p. 249). Thinking that 
epistemic vagueness can provide us with the ability to separate emergent from non-
emergent from basal conditions would be an ungrounded belief. The only true refuge it 
can provide is the ontological possibility that these exists, because there can be no such 
thing as ontological indeterminacy.  
This does not, however, doom us to having to accept some sort of nihilistic conclusion, 
that we cannot know anything because our descriptive language by which we categorize 
is inherently vague. I think there are theoretical definitions of phenomena that are not 
vague, and some that are not problematically vague. 
The vagueness is not problematic on a purely epistemic view of emergence. I have held back on 
separating too much between the epistemic and ontological views of emergence in my 
argumentation partly because the points I have made are applicable to both positions, 
and second, I don’t think the difference between them is that big. To the first point, as I 
have already mentioned, the vague extension of emergent phenomena is not only a 
problem for the ontology of the emergent theory that produced the extension. It is also 
very much an epistemic problem, as we cannot refer to the specific higher level 
properties without running into issues with vagueness, leaving the epistemic aspect 
severely limited. It does not matter that the theory does not claim that these levels or 
phenomena exists, but merely that they seem to exist, if we cannot provide any non-
arbitrary extension for those levels and phenomena. If fact, the fact that we cannot 
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reliably tell what is emergent and what isn’t, leaves us with very little motivation to keep 
any emergent model at all, if the ontological truth of emergence is not assumed or 
argued for. If, however, the epistemic account for emergence is intended to be 
completely void of positive content, and is just intended as a non-ontologically 
committed abstract concept, with as little root in natural phenomena like statistical or 
economical models, then it could be scientifically viable as long as the model is not 
confused for the world. 
Lastly, I would like to address the point that accepting Supervaluation solves vagueness, and 
therefore also solves the vagueness argument against emergence. This line of critique is similarly to 
the suggestion that accepting epistemic vagueness would help, misguided. The result in 
Supervaluation logic to solve vagueness, is simply to make room in logic for 
indeterminacy. This means that, contrary to epistemic vagueness, it is perfectly possible 
for something to be neither emergent and non-emergent. This is not at all helpful if we 
want to establish the theoretical groundwork for weakly emergent phenomena, as a lot 
of the wanted extension of it would be undetermined, and therefore would not have the 
kind of power we would want. If we repeat the example of a glider in the Game of Life, 
and ask “a glider cell-configuration in the Game of life has a weakly emergent property”, 
this proposition would be indeterminate, because it would be true on some 
presifications, like Bedaus understanding of non-derivability and simulation and so on, 
and untrue on others, like Chalmers sparse view of emergence.  
I think that the sparse view of emergence is perhaps consistent with Supervaluation, as 
you could argue that “Consciousness is a strongly emergent property of the brain” is true 
on all precisifications, but it might not be the case. If a predicate is indeterminate, it does 
not mean that it is theoretically useless, it just means that it will not refer to a specific 
extension. This means that it is not useful in working as a guide to refer us to all the 
cases of emergence. 
3.3 Consequences 
All this will lead us to having to make some decisions. If emergence is vague, like 
described in the previous sections, we can put forth some challenges to a hierarchical 
understanding of emergence. Vague predicates have unclear borders, and there is no 
reason to say that emergence happens at a certain point of complexity. We can easily 
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construct a sorites example with emergence, the same way we did with a heap, showing 
us that we do not have these clear separations between non-emerged and emerged. 
Physics, chemistry, biology and the other special sciences just fade into each other. This 
is not to say that my arguments commit us to an ontological denial of emergent levels, as 
I covered.   
On the one hand, we could accept this vagueness as an obstacle in language, and go 
from there. This will lead us to solutions in the vain of some n-value logic or the 
stronger option, Supervaluation. Yet none of these, even if accepted fully, would help us 
solve the problems we are facing. They would only help us make due with vagueness in 
logic; how to work around it. They would not provide us with the theoretical backbone 
we need to make emergent levels suddenly exist at a certain point. To make room for 
this, the emergentist might have to accept some sort of epistemic view of vagueness. 
Although vagueness as discussed here is a linguistic matter, it seems that it points us to 
the inability to arrive at sharp ontological boundaries, because we start out on vague 
linguistic grounds. I think that this linguistic analysis of a process of determining 
ontology has epistemic and ontological consequences in the sense that it limits what 
positions we can accept in good faith. 
Recall that in the explicit form of my argument from the introduction, I sketched out 
three possible responses to my argument, given acceptance of the premises: Accepting 
some sort of scientific nihilism, accept epistemic vagueness and lastly denying emergent 
levels. This is slightly misleading, because accepting the second might also lead you to 
rejecting emergent hierarchies, or at least rejecting that we can have epistemic knowledge 
of it. The first option seems like an overreaction, because why would this linguistic 
problem with defining emergent phenomena lead us to scientific nihilism? It is because 
nihilism about bivalence is a response to vagueness in general, and not just this specific 
case. So, if we respond to the challenge of vagueness with refusal to believe that anything 
can be or not be, and that everything is vague and problematic, then there is not much 
we could say about science, and nihilism in the one would lead to nihilism in the other. 
Lastly there is the denial of epistemic levels, which is not as anti-emergent as it sounds, 
at least it does not have to be. The denial is about the ontological claims of emergent 
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levels, and probably a denial of the epistemic possibility of identifying even non-
ontological emergent layers in a non-vague way, but still it is not any more than that. 
While denying emergent levels, we can still use emergence as a methodological tool in 
science, and as a model for reality, but that does not necessitate accepting it as 
ontological truth. Similarly, we are not required to think the atom looks like the Bohr 
model we have for it in physics, with the sphere like atom in the middle and the 
neutrons and positrons revolving around it like moons around a planet. It is simply a 
model made for easier understanding, not for naturalistic representation, and so we can 
keep the models of emergence, as explanatory tools, but must reject its claims of being a 
true representation of the phenomena it models. 
Further the idea that there is some hierarchical nature of emergent special sciences is 
highly problematic. The sort of hierarchical emergent structure of nature, as suggested 
by Ellis should be seen as confusing the model with reality (Ellis, 2006).  As I have 
shown, there are major obstacles when we want to define the kind of functional 
descriptions of the emergent levels. These obstacles, show us that there is vagueness and 
arbitrariness in including and excluding phenomena as emergent from something. This 
has the consequence that we cannot decisively say what kinds of phenomena count as 
the domain of one special science, and what kinds of phenomena count as another, 
purely on the grounds of our theoretical analysis of emergence; the extensions of the 
domain of the special sciences is bound to be vague, on an emergent theoretical model 
of division. 
Looking at sciences as the plateaus of emergent phenomena is misleading. As the 
defining features of these layers are vague, there are any number of plateaus that are not 
accounted for, that fades into each other, it is confusing the discussion even to talk 
about them as plateaus, because no case can be made for them existing without 
accepting some account of epistemic vagueness. If not, then we need to give a logically 
sound explanation to what it is for these conditions to be undetermined. Either way, this 
divide in levels would not be determinable in the former case, and non-existent in the 
latter. Because of this, the doctrine that emergence shows us the true special sciences, or 
even eludes to where they lie in the scientific landscape, is untrue. Even graver than this, 
the process of going from theoretical understanding of some phenomena, into 
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generalizing the conditions for its occurrence, and use that to generate new examples of 
the same type of phenomena, is riddled with problems. 
For these reasons, we should not be so eager to accept emergentist levels so 
wholeheartedly. There is more reason to believe that if emergence exists in any 
meaningful way, then its shape is not one with clear definable levels, but rather a gradual 
continuum. 
Summary 
In this thesis, I have used the methodology and theoretical research provided by 
Timothy Williamson and Rosanna Keefe on vagueness, to shed light on some of the 
issues of emergence. I have presented various versions of emergent strength, their 
characteristics, the main objections to emergence and the scope of emergent application. 
Lastly, I have presented my argument for vagueness in emergence in general, but more 
specifically, as a problem for emergent levels.  
I think the modern emergence project is somewhat undecided on central points. On the 
one hand, they want to move away from the objectionable ontologies that in the end 
proved to be the downfall of British Emergentism, and focus more on the epistemic, 
usable emergence for scientific methodologies. On the other, there seems to be a hope 
that ontological emergence could be recovered, and that emergence with a rehabilitated 
ontology would provide us with a framework of the natural world, that would lead to 
new understanding. I think modern emergentists do their view a disservice if the latter is 
attempted, as the ontologically non-committal path of emergence as utility seems a much 
more fruitful one, although its expectations needs to be managed. I have two main 
reasons for this claim: ontological emergence runs into problems witch causal 
over/underdetermination, as shown in the causal exclusion argument, and emergent 
phenomena are bound to be vague, leaving the ontology problematically impotent. My 
argument, as I hope I have shown, does not say that the ontological commitments are 
false, but that even if they were developed with no internal problems, like the causal 
exclusion problem, it would still not provide us with any useful tools for identifying 
emergent properties, their relations, or separating between supposed emergent levels, 
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because emergence is too vague. I have also made the point that even the epistemically 
focused variant of emergence is problematic, if its expectations are not managed. 
What is clearly apparent is that emergence is a modern and dynamic field of 
philosophical research and debate, with major contributions being very recent, by the 
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